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In federal court, various appealability doctrines govern whether a decision can be 
immediately appealed. Some doctrines apply to clearer categories of orders, like 
injunctions. Others apply to more amorphous categories of orders, like the different “final 
decisions” appealable under multiple interpretations of the final-judgment rule. The 
Supreme Court has directed courts to decide appealability based only on whole categories 
of orders, not on the facts of individual cases. But that categorical imperative has not 
stopped courts from creating varied new categories of orders to deem final-for-appeal.
This paper draws on insights from cognitive psychology to understand how courts 
conceive of categories of orders. Cognitive psychologists have shown that people 
understand the world using not only “classical categories” based on logical definitions, 
but also “conceptual categories” based on fuzzier, intuitive concepts of similarity and 
typicality. This paper approaches appealability as a two-step process—first, categorizing 
the order and, second, applying the appropriate doctrine. Previous interventions have 
focused on whether different doctrines use rules or standards at the second step. This 
paper focuses on the initial categorization step.
This paper makes two contributions to the study of federal appealability. First, it 
maps the appealability doctrines on both a rules–standards continuum and a classical–
conceptual categorical continuum. It shows that different applications of the final-
judgment rule employ different categorical approaches. Sometimes, when applied to 
formal final judgments and truly final orders, the final-judgment rule uses classical 
categories of finality. But in other applications, particularly the finality-for-appeal 
doctrines, it uses conceptual categories. Second, this paper argues that, despite the 
Supreme Court’s categorical imperative, courts should employ a flexible conceptual 
approach to identify new categories of orders that are final-for-appeal. It posits some 
potential features of those new conceptual categories. Over time, intuitive, conceptual 
categories could produce more definite classical categories, but only if courts have the 
opportunity to implement and iterate on them. Shutting down the finality-for-appeal 
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INTRODUCTION
When it comes to federal appeals, every lawyer knows at least two things. We all 
know the final-judgment rule: y
at the end of the case.1 And we all know that the final-judgment rule is not really true. 
There are exceptions that allow immediate appeals from non-final decisions. And there are 
judge-made doctrines that deem other decisions final-for-appeal, even though they do not 
end the case. It is probably safe to say that we also all know that the resulting system of 
federal appealability doctrines is complex and sometimes confusing.2
The doctrines governing appealability in federal court are numerous and varied. 
They are found not only in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,3 but also in statutes,4 and 
case law.5 They can be bright-line rules that always allow immediate appeals or contextual 
standards that only sometimes allow them, or they can seem to combine both rules and 
standards. They are all related to the venerable final-judgment rule, but the relationship is 
not always clear, and the contours of the final-judgment rule itself are murky. 
This is not to say that the appealability doctrines are broken. Indeed, for most cases 
they work well determining whether an order is immediately appealable is just a matter 
of applying the appropriate rule or standard. For the cases that do not fit neatly within an 
existing doctrine, the Supreme Court has imposed a type of categorical imperative to direct 
how courts decide them.6 First, the Court has held that judges may not create new 
appealability doctrines.7 If a judge wants to permit an appeal from a decision that is not 
covered by an existing doctrine, the judge must explain why the decision should 
nonetheless be deemed final-for-appeal under the final-judgment rule.8 Second, the Court 
has held that judges making that finality-for-appeal determination must do so based not on 
[es]
9
Despite that categorical imperative, the Courts of Appeals continue to identify new, 
                                                          
 1. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 2. The criticisms of the federal appealability system are legion.  
The current system has b legal gymnastics
overlapping exceptions, each less 
a jurisprudence of 
- a crazy quilt, a near-
sorely in need of limi
Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1238 39 (2007) (citations and 
internal footnotes omitted). 
3. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f), 54(b).  
4. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292. 
5. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
 6. -in-
[a]ct only according to that 
structure: only allow appeals according to a rule whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should be a 
universal rule to allow appeals from that entire category of decisions. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR 
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 30 (James Wesley Ellington trans., 3d ed. 1993) (1785). 
 7. The Supreme Court has directed that any new appealability doctrines must be developed only through 
legislation and rulemaking. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 112 14 (2009). 
8. Id. at 113 14. 
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contested categories of potentially final-for-appeal orders usually by applying an 
interpretation of the final-judgment rule known as the collateral-order doctrine. The Third 
and Ninth Circuits are split over whether interlocutory orders declining to enforce statutes 
of repose are final-for-appeal.10 The Fifth and Tenth Circuits are split over whether 
-for-appeal.11 The 
Second Circuit has split from the Fifth and Ninth over whether orders declining to dismiss 
cases under anti-SLAPP statutes are final-for-appeal.12 Three Circuits have held that 
orders declining to appoint counsel in civil cases are final-for-appeal, but nine Circuits 
have held that they are not.13 The Ninth Circuit, but no other, has held that orders 
-for-appeal.14 The D.C. Circuit, but no other, has held 
-for-appeal.15
This article treats making appealability determinations as a two-step process: 
categorizing the order and then applying the appropriate doctrine for that category. These 
circuit splits show that courts still disagree about which orders should be appealable at the 
second step. But they also show that courts can be endlessly creative in how they conceive 
of different categories of orders at the first step. Even when ostensibly constrained by 
applying the same collateral-order doctrine, courts categorize orders based on everything 
from the law they apply (statutes of repose, anti-SLAPP statutes), to their likely effects 
(affecting First Amendment rights, requiring expenditures of public funds), to whom they 
affect (parties, nonparties, indigent parties) and to combinations of all of the above. 
There is no single set of features, traits, or aspects of an order that courts agree are relevant 
when categorizing orders. 
In this article, I do not try to resolve these particular circuit splits but rather to explain 
how courts keep recognizing different categories of potentially appealable decisions. 
While commentators have examined which doctrinal forms (rules or standards) work best 
at the second step,16 less attention has been paid to how courts categorize decisions in the 
                                                          
10. Compare Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 283 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002), with
Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 454 F.3d 163, 172 74 (3d Cir. 2006). 
11. Compare  (citing Marceaux v. 
Lafayette City- th Cir. 2013), and In re Hearst Newspapers, L.L.C., 641 
F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2011), with In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices, 641 F. 3d 470, 482 (10th Cir. 2011). 
12. Compare Ernst v. Carrigan, 814 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2016), with DC Comics v. Pac. Pictures Corp., 706 
F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2013), and NCDR, L.L.C. v. Mauze & Bagby, P.L.L.C., 745 F.3d 742, 749 (5th Cir. 
2014). 
13. See Matthew R. Pikor, Note, The Collateral Order Doctrine in Disorder: Redefining Finality, 92 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 619, 638 (2017) (collecting cases). 
 14. Copeland v. Ryan, 852 F.3d 900, 904 05 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 15. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm n, 896 F.3d 520, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
16. See, e.g., Scott Dodson & Elizabeth McCuskey, Structuring Jurisdictional Rules and Standards 
Response, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 31 (2012); Bryan Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie: The Exaggerated Death 
of the Balancing Approach and the Inescapable Allure of Flexibility in Appellate Jurisdiction, 51 U. RICH. L.
REV. 371 (2017) [hereinafter Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie]; Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards, and 
Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 423 (2013) [hereinafter Lammon, Rules, Standards];
John C. Nagel, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Jurisprudence with Discretionary Review 
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first place. Understanding the initial categorization question means building on the well-
known rules-vs-standards dichotomy to theorize how judges conceptualize categories. 
the variety of human experience into categories.17 And cognitive psychologists have 
shown that we rely on categories to understand the world in everyday life.18 But 
experiments in cognitive psychology prove that our everyday mental categories work in 
surprising ways.19 Categories resist clear definitions; some members seem to fit categories 
al definition to do so. And we tend 
to feel intuitively that some birds (like robins) fit the category better than others 
(flamingoes, penguins, ostriches). And what about, say, feathered dinosaurs? 
Our mental categories work this way because people including judges do not 
usually categorize things according to logical rules and standards. While some of our 
definitions with necessary-and-sufficient characteristics, many are not. Instead we use 
intuitive understandings based on perceived similarity. Cognitive psychologists call those 
structure: at the center are prototypes and exemplars, quintessential category-members that 
we use to anchor the concept. Other category-members are recognized based on our sense 
of their similarity to the prototypes and exemplars. We do not categorize animals as 
-like dictionary definit -like sense of 
of birds in our heads (something like a sparrow, or, more accurately, our mental idea of a 
sparrow-like bird). 
Sometimes judges must recognize categories of decisions for appeal the same way. 
Some appealability doctrines use clear, classical categories and bright-line rules to identify 
appealable decisions but others, particularly the collateral-order doctrine and the other 
finality-for-appeal interpretations of the final-judgment rule, use radial conceptual 
thinking. The formal final judgment that ends a case is clearly defined by a classical 
definition and procedural markers. But the categories of orders that are deemed final-for-
appeal remain more conceptual and amorphous. Recognizing the role of conceptual 
categories in the various appealability doctrines helps explain how judges have reshaped, 
and will continue to reshape, the categories of orders deemed final for appeal. And it also 
suggests that judges can 
identify categories of appealable orders using conceptual models of finality, rather than 
continuing to strive for an unobtainable classical, rule-like purity. Although that 
                                                          
to Define Federal Jurisdiction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 507 (2012). 
 17. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 453 54 (1930). 
18. See STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 69 (2003). 
 19. See generally id.; GREGORY MURPHY, THE BIG BOOK OF CONCEPTS (2004) [hereinafter MURPHY,
BBOC]; Gregory Murphy, What Are Categories and Concepts?, in THE MAKING OF HUMAN CONCEPTS 11 
(Denis Mareschal et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter Murphy, What Are Categories and Concepts?]; Mark L. Johnson, 
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conceptual approach might not provide the immediate clarity of a bright-line rule, neither 
have the numerous existing appealability doctrines. Using a conceptual approach instead 
would build on the signature strength of common-law adjudication evolution over 
time to guide judicial development of new categories of appealable orders. 
Part I, below, explains why appeals doctrines matter and the traditional rules-vs.-
standards approach to describing their formal logic. Part II discusses some recurrent issues 
in appealability, including the confusing idea of finality, and the categorical nature of the 
appealability inquiry. Part III describes how concept theory and cognitive psychological 
concept models explain the different categories we use to understand the world and the 
roles they play in law. Part IV applies concept theory to the major appealability doctrines 
(except the finality-for-appeals doctrines), mapping them by both the formal logic and the 
categorical models they employ. Part V, applies that same mapping approach to the 
finality-for-appeals doctrines and the article concludes that courts should explicitly use 
concept models to recognize new categories of orders that are final-for-appeal. 
I. UNDERSTANDING APPEALABILITY
Deciding what orders should be appealable implicates the policy debate between the 
values of systemic efficiency and individual fairness. Clear rules usually promote 
efficiency, while flexible standards usually promote fairness. The history of the major 
federal appealability doctrines reflects the development of different rule-like or standard-
like strategies to that policy debate. 
A. Efficiency and Fairness 
Justice Breyer recently reiterated why the doctrines governing appealability matter: 
On the one hand, t]oo few interlocutory appeals will too often impose upon parties delay 
and expense that an interlocutory appeal, by quickly correcting a lower court error, might 
20 [t]oo many interlocutory appeals will too 
often unnecessarily delay proceedings while a party appeals and loses. And delays can 
clog the appellate system, thereby slowing down the workings, and adding to the costs, of 
21
Deciding which orders should be immediately appealable implicates two conflicting 
values: the efficiency of the adjudicative system and fairness to individual litigants.22 The 
need to balance systemic efficiency and individual fairness manifests itself in every aspect 
of the design of an appellate system. It influences how many interlocutory appeals to allow: 
allowing too few is unfair to parties in that system.23 It also influences what kinds of 
                                                          
 20. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1423 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
21. Id.
22. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 171 (1974) (quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion 
Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)
the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on 
see also Pikor, supra note 13, at 622. 
 23. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1423 (Breyer, J., dissenting). It is generally more efficient to allow fewer 
interlocutory appeals, which tends to speed up resolution of cases and lower litigation costs but also to decrease 
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appealability doctrines exist: On the one hand, the need for an efficient court system 
demands that appealability doctrines be clear and predictable, saving litigants the needless 
which appeals to allow. On the other hand, individual fairness demands that appealability 
doctrines be flexible and adaptable to unexpected circumstances where justice demands 
an immediate appeal in a particular case.24
These considerations are not new. The 
considerations that always compete in the question of appealability the most important of 
which are the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger 
of denying justice by delay on the ot 25 And the Court has described the history of 
that will encompass all situations and at other times to take hardship cases out from under 
the rigidity of previous 26
B. Rules and Standards 
The tension between systemic efficiency and individual fairness is often understood 
to implicate the familiar choice between rules and standards. Rules are doctrines that 
dictate ahead of time all of the relevant elements and mandate the outcome of a decision 
based on the presence or absence of those elements.27 Standards are doctrines that do not 
dictate elements or outcomes ex ante; they describe general goals and guidelines (e.g., 
reasonableness) for the court to apply. Broadly speaking, rules limit judicial discretion and 
decision making, while standards expand judicial discretion and decision making. Thus, 
standard.28
The arguments in favor of each are familiar.29 Rules promote stability, efficiency, 
and clarity; standards promote adaptability, fairness, and practicality.30 The arguments 
                                                          
interlocutory appeals, which tends to correct more errors sooner but also to cause delays and increase litigation 
costs. That being said, these are only general tendencies. In a particular case, allowing an appeal before the end 
of the case can prolong litigation, increasing litigation costs and delaying resolution of the dispute. But, in another 
case, postponing the appeal until the end of the trial-court portion of the case can cause parties to waste time and 
effort in trial-level litigation only to have it all undone by a reversal on appeal (or it can cause parties to settle, 
thereby preventing some issues from ever being resolved). 
 24. Bryan Lammon, Finality, Appealability, and the Scope of Interlocutory Review, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1809, 
1818 (2018) [hereinafter Lammon, Finality, Appealability]. To be sure, this dichotomy is not as polarized as this 
brief description suggests. Predictability also benefits individuals by giving individual litigants notice and 
decreasing their uncertainty when making litigation decisions. And flexibility also benefits the system by 
allowing for fairer outcomes in specific situations and improving public trust in the adjudicatory system. See 
Cass R. Sunstein, Two Conceptions of Procedural Fairness, 73 SOC. RES. 619 (2006). 
 25. Dickinson, 338 U.S. at 511. 
26. Id.; see also Microsoft v. Baker, 137 S. -knell 
likely enhance[d] the quality of justice afforded a few litigants,
cost to . . .  (internal citations omitted). 
 27. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 961 62 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Rules 
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559 60 (1992). 
28. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 16 (2011); Kaplow, 
supra note 27, at 560; Sunstein, supra note 27, at 964 65. 
 29. Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV.
and against rules and standards). 
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against them are also well known. Pure rules are blunt instruments, often over- or under-
inclusive, and unresponsive to unforeseen distinguishing features of particular cases.31
Pure standards are mercurial creatures, often vague, and unpredictable in their application 
even to seemingly similar cases.32
To facilitate comparisons, commentators often describe them as if they were 
Platonic forms, comparing pure rules with pure standards.33
unresolvable dialectic.34 Most legal doctrines use both doctrinal forms and mix rule-like 
and standard-like features.35 Indeed, legal doctrines tend to shift from one to the other over 
time.36 Rules become more standard-like: when courts adopt unexpected interpretations 
to avoid seemingly undesirable outcomes; when multiple rules are subsumed under a 
broader standard in the name of restating the doctrine; and when specific rules are re-
interpreted or restated as general standard-like goals and principles.37 And standards 
become more rule-like: when courts learn to apply them and establish precedential 
landmarks; when multiple standards are rationalized or restated under a broad rule; and 
when standard-like descriptive terms become rule-like terms of art.38
C. The Rules-Standards Continuum of Appealability Doctrines 
The history of the federal appealability doctrines illustrates this tension and 
unresolved dialectic. When it comes to appealability, neither formal approach has 
prevailed.39 The competing goals of efficiency and fairness have given rise to a patchwork 
landscape of doctrines using both forms, with some doctrines appearing to embody both 
approaches at once. The major trans-substantive appealability doctrines discussed below40
can be compared on the rules-standards continuum. And most innovations in 
appealability and most proposed reforms have involved moving particular doctrines 
                                                          
1685, 1687 1701 (1976). 
31. See Kaplow, supra note 27, at 561 62; Sunstein, supra note 27, at 957 58; Schlag, supra note 29, at 384
32. See Kaplow, supra note 27, at 561 62; Sunstein, supra note 27, at 957 58. 
 33. Kaplow, supra note 27, at 561. 
 34. Schlag, supra note 29, at 383. 
 35. Kaplow, supra note 27, at 561; see also Sunstein, supra note 27, at 960 69 (describing other types of 
criteria, such as factors, guidelines, and principles, which share traits with both rules and standards). A common 
hybrid example would be a standard that includes specific factors to be considered. 
 36. Dodson, supra note 28, at 19 20; Schlag, supra note 29, at 429. 
 37. See Dodson, supra note 28, at 19; Schlag, supra note 29, at 429. 
 38. See Dodson, supra note 28, at 19; Schlag, supra note 29, at 429. 
 39. Lammon, Rules, Standards, supra note 16, at 424 25. 
 40. In addition to the trans-substantive appealability doctrines discussed here, there are subject-specific 
appealability doctrines. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1) (3) (provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
[s] with respect to an 
[arbitration] award  1453(c)(1) (authorizing discretionary appeals from rulings permitting removal 
liability rulings in cases governed by the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act (MMTJA) before the 
actions are remanded to state courts to determine damages); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) (authorizing immediate 
[i]nterlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof determining the rights and 
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along the continuum, making them more rule-like or more standard-like. 41
In 1932, Carleton M. Crick wrote an influential article calling into question the 
utility and efficiency of the final-
. . . complete discretionary power as to the cases which 42 Other scholars 
have also called for moving away from bright-line rules and using discretionary standards 
to decide appealability.43 Still others have advocated for a clearer system using more
bright-line rules.44 Dissatisfaction and the push-pull of different proposals is apparent in 
the history of the federal appealability doctrines. 
When legislators and rule-makers feel the need for greater predictability and 
efficiency, they enact more rule-like doctrines, such as § 1292(a)(1) (2), which allow for 
appeals from injunctions and receiverships. When they feel the need for greater flexibility, 
they enact more standard-like doctrines, such as § 1292(b) which allows for appeals when 
a district court finds that an appeal is appropriate to resolve an important issue. And courts 
do the same thing. When courts feel the need for greater predictability or systemic 
efficiency, they interpret the final-judgment rule more formalistically as a strict rule, such 
as when the Supreme Court limited the reach of the death-knell doctrine.45 But when 
courts feel the need for greater flexibility or individual fairness, they interpret the final-
judgment rule more loosely, such as when the Supreme Court first recognized the collateral 
order doctrine.46
As a result, the various appealability doctrines are spread along the rules-standards 
continuum. Few doctrines are pure rules or pure standards. But each doctrine has more 
rule-like or more standard-like characteristics. Very broadly speaking: the earlier statutes 
and rules the original, strict version of the final-judgment rule, and § 1292(a) tend to 
be more rule-like. The twentieth-century statutory and rulemaking innovations §
1292(b), Rule 54(b), and Rule 23(f) tend to be more standard-like. Thus, the variable 
-for- ying the final-judgment rule are all 
over the map. 
Some of the different meanings of finality can be attributed to the different purposes 
to which the idea of finality is put in different legal contexts.47 But even for the limited 
                                                          
41. See Lammon, Rules, Standards, supra note 16, at 432 33. 
 42. Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 564 (1932). 
43. See, e.g., Howard B. Eisenberg & Alan B. Morrison, Discretionary Appellate Review of Non-Final 
Orders: It’s Time to Change the Rules, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 285 (1999); Robert J. Martineau, Defining 
Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717 (1993). 
44. See, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: A New “Serbonian Bog” and Four 
Proposals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539 (1997 1998) (proposing more rule-like and more standard-like 
versions of the collateral-order doctrine); Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review 
of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175 (2001); Pikor, supra note 13 (arguing for a more rule-like 
collateral-order doctrine); Steinman, supra note 2 (arguing for a rule-like application of the collateral order 
doctrine to immunity-appeals, and discretionary appeals otherwise). 
45. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 473 (1978). 
 46. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
 47. The idea of finality has different meanings in contexts other than appealability. In the habeas context, a 
eeking 
such review.  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)
See 18A CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4432 (3d ed. 
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-
multiple meanings: It can refer to the formal final judgment, a separate document entered 
at the end of a case, by which the district court separates itself from the case, based on the 
tradition
48: i.e., a decision made near the end of a case, that decides the merits of the case 
49 Or, in a third sense, 
-for-
not decide the merits of the case, and leaves more for the court to decide, but that is 
nonetheless considered appealable under one of the judge-made, finality-for-appeal 
doctrines. 
Incorporating those different ideas of finality, the rule-standards continuum looks 
something like Figure 1.             
II. RECURRENT APPEALABILITY ISSUES
The received wisdom among commentators and courts is that the system of federal 
appealability doctrines is a jumble of unsatisfactory solutions to the recurrent problem of 
50 The patchwork of appealability doctrines has 
51 52 to a jurisprudence 
53 Many of the criticisms and proposals argue that 
some or all of the doctrines should be more rule-like others argue they should be more 
standard-
the ambiguities around the concept of finality. 
                                                          
See Lammon, Finality, Appealability, supra note 24, at 1844 50. 
 48. Lammon, Finality, Appealability, supra note 24, at 1825. 
 49. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 299, 233 (1945). 
 50. Steinman, supra note 2, at 1237. 
 51. Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the Federal Finality-Appealability Problem, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
171, 172 (1984). 
 52. Anderson, supra note 44, at 539. 
 53. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 292 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); see 
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A. The Persistent Problem of Finality 
. . . has been 
54 As 
explained above, § - e
perceived harshness and inefficiency of that rule has led courts to adopt numerous 
-for-appeal doctrines
55 the collateral 
order doctrine,56 and the defunct death-knell doctrine57 each of which treats as final 
certain orders that do not actually end the case. The core application of the final-judgment 
rule to formal final judgments entered at the end of a case is discussed below in Part 
IV.A.1. The various finality-for-appeal doctrines are discussed in Part V. 
For now, it suffices to note the two fundamental frustrations judges and scholars 
often express about the resulting concept of finality, both of which are captured in Justice 
Gillespie:
whether a ruling is final  within the meaning of § 1291 is frequently so close a question 
that decision of that issue either way can be supported with equally forceful arguments, and 
. . . it is impossible to devise a formula to resolve all marginal cases coming within what 
might well be called the twilight zone  of finality.58
In other words, the idea of finality is hard to define, and its boundaries are fuzzy. 
Finality is hard to define. As the Supreme Court has recognized, its finality 
can explain prior finality decisions with unerring accuracy or provide an utterly reliable 
59 In another famous complaint, Judge Jerome Frank observed that 
-purpose word; it is slithery, tricky. It does not have a meaning 
60
Finality has fuzzy boundaries. The Supreme Court has also acknowledged (usually 
when relaxing the strict final-judgment rule) that, whatever the definition of finality, its 
borders are unclear. In Gillespie, Justice Black referred to the twilight zone  of finality.61
And Justice Frankfurter noted in Radio Station WOW
62
In short, the category of orders that are considered final is not susceptible to a clear 
definition and borderline cases keep cropping up. Deciding whether an order is final is less 
                                                          
 54. McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Cent. R. Co., 146 U.S. 536, 544 45 (1892). In 1892, the Court referred to 
id., but it repeated the lament well after the adoption 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolished separate courts of equity and tried to impose some order on the 
question of appealability. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950). 
55. See Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 203 (1848); see generally 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3910 (2d ed. 1991). 
56. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
57. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 473 (1978). 
 58. Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964). 
 59. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974). 
 60. United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land in Babylon, 129 F.2d 678, 680 (2d Cir. 1942). 
 61. Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 152. 
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, 63 It is a 
question of categorization. 
B. The Question of Categorization 
-by-
of the appealability doctrines whether they employ a rule, a standard, or something in-
between operate categorically in that they each apply only to a particular category of 
cases. For example, the final-judgment rule uses a rule permitting an immediate appeal, 
but it only applies to orders categorized as final decisions while Rule 23(f) uses a 
discretionary standard for deciding appealability, but it only applies to class certification 
orders. 
Every appealability doctrine, therefore, implicates not only the question of logical 
form (rule or standard?) but also an initial categorization question (what category of 
decisions is subject to the doctrine?). When crafting an appealability doctrine, rule-makers 
must consider both questions: First, which kinds of orders should be eligible for immediate 
appeal? Second, how should courts decide whether a decision is appealable? Likewise, 
when judges apply an existing appealability doctrine, they must make two separate 
inquiries: First, to what category of decisions does the doctrine apply? And, second, under 
the appropriate rule or standard, is it appealable? 
The two questions are not always explicit. Courts often seem to skip one or to 
conflate them, usually because the outcome is obvious or presumed. For doctrines 
employing bright line rules, the rule itself is easily applied, and the difficult analysis 
actually happens at the initial categorization step. (It is easy to apply the rule that all final 
decisions are appealable; it is harder to identify a final decision.) For doctrines employing 
malleable standards, the categorization step can be simple, while the case-by-case 
decision-making can be more difficult. (It is easy to identify a class certification order; it 
is harder to apply a discretionary standard to decide if 
These initial categorization questions implicate the policy concerns of systemic 
efficiency and individual fairness. As a purely numerical matter, having fewer categories 
of appealable orders is more efficient because it tends to decrease the number of appeals, 
overall litigation costs, and judicial workload but having more categories is fairer in 
individual cases because it tends to increase the opportunities for error correction.64 It also 
makes a difference how the categories are determined or constituted. Categories are not 
fixed or stable things. Having clearly defined categories of immediately appealable orders 
is systemically more efficient because it tends to decrease the costs of litigating each 
                                                          
 63. Distinguished jurists disagree on this crucial categorization question. Compare Sophie Tatum & Caroline 
Kenny, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Settles it for Stephen Colbert: Hot Dogs Are Sandwiches, CNN (Mar. 22, 2018),  
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/22/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-stephen-colbert-workout/index.html (Ginsburg, 
J., opining that hot dogs are sandwiches), with Judge John Hodgman, A Hot Dog Is Not a Sandwich,
MAXIMUMFUN (Mar. 26, 2020), https://maximumfun.org/episodes/judge-john-hodgman/a-hot-dog-is-not-a-
sandwich/ (Hodgman, J., opining that hot dogs are not sandwiches). 
 64. As with the rules-vs-standards debate, these tendencies are not absolute. Experience has shown, for 
example, that limiting appeals only to a single category of decisions (final judgments) would probably give rise 
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appealability question but having flexibly described categories is fairer in individual 
cases because it allows for more particularized decision-making.65
The Supreme Court has long emphasized that the appealability doctrines operate 
categorically (without explicitly discussing the categorical inquiry as a separate step). The 
66 because they do not address the circumstances of individual cases, they set 
the rules by which different kinds of cases may proceed. And the Court more recently has 
issued a categorical imperative to judges: When applying the finality-for-appeal doctrines, 
67 ch individual case engage in ad hoc balancing to decide 
68 . . . determine[ 69
Rather than making an individualized [appellate] jurisdictional inquiry a
focus[] on the entire category to 
which a claim belongs. 70 That means that judges must not only decide whether the order 
order belongs, and then apply the appropriate finality-for-appeal doctrine to that whole 
category.71
Despite that effort to restrain judicial discretion, history has shown that parties and 
judges cannot resist the allure of flexibility and will find ways to push at the boundaries of 
any definition.72 l conceive 
of new categories of orders to deem final for appeal.73 But that is not to say that judicial 
discretion is entirely unhampered by the categorical imperative. Although the category of 
final decisions is fuzzy and resists definition, and although judges have some freedom to 
formulate new conceptions of categories to deem final-for-appeal, the idea of finality is 
not entirely amorphous and there are flexible-but-structured concepts that direct how 
judges conceive of categories. 
                                                          
 65. This seems to be the general presumption, but it is not necessarily always true and has not been 
empirically verified. See, Lammon, Rules, Standards, supra note 16, at 432 (noting that commentators proposing 
solutions disagree about the effects of various reforms on appellate workloads). Whether it holds true likely 
depends on context and different kinds of decisions may be more amenable to more classically defined categories 
or more conceptually constituted categories, as discussed below. 
 66. Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 405 (1957). 
 67. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 315 (1995) (citing Digital Equip., Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 
863, 868 (1994)). 
 68. Id.
 69. Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 876 77 (1994). 
70. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 588 U.S. 100, 101 (2009) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 
U.S. 463, 473 (1978); Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 868)). 
 71. The Court has also declared a moratorium on courts creating new finality doctrines through case law. 
Swint v. Chambers Cty. 
the way to define or refine when a district court 
created through rulemaking. Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1714 
 72. Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 16, at 410 15. 
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III. CATEGORY AND CONCEPT THEORY
A. Introducing Categories and Concepts 
Cognitive psychology uses concept theory to explain how people understand 
categories.74 Psychologists have shown experimentally that we rely on categorical 
thinking to organize and structure our lives,75 and we do not understand most categories 
in everyday life by applying formal rules with necessary-and-sufficient elements.76 Nor, 
for the most part, do we use standard-like general principles or lists of abstract factors. 
Instead, we use mental models to conceptualize categories. Using quintessential members 
of a category as central anchors, we create conceptual models with radial structures. And 
we use those radial models to identify other category members based on their similarity to 
(or difference from) those prototypes and exemplars.77
A category, according to cognitive psychologists, is a set of items (objects, ideas, 
78 treat all of the items (animals) 
consider them suitable pets in Western society; require them to be registered with the city; 
etc. 
Psychological categories structure our interactions with the world. When we think 
how we treat Fido. Only by categorizing disparate items together are we able to treat them 
operation of law. Treating disparate things as equivalent for some purpose
is one of the fundamental principles of a just legal system.79
                                                          
74. See WINTER, supra note 18, at 69; MURPHY, BBOC, supra note 19, at 41 71; Murphy, What Are 
Categories and Concepts?, supra note 19. 
 75. WINTER, supra note 18, at 69. 
 76. Cognitive psychologists continue to debate and design experiments to uncover the origins of cognitive 
categories. Some see them as biological or evolutionary in origin. Olga F. Lazareva & Edward A. Wasserman, 
Category Learning and Concept Learning in Birds, in THE MAKING OF HUMAN CONCEPTS 151 (Denis Mareschal 
et al. eds., 2010); Michèle Fabre-Thorpe, Concepts in Monkeys, in THE MAKING OF HUMAN CONCEPTS 201 
(Denis Mareschal et al. eds., 2010). Some see them as mental structures that metaphorically represent embodied 
realities. Johnson, supra note 19, at 852 56; see generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS 
WE LIVE BY (2003). But even without a single unifying explanation, cognitive psychologists have constructed 
models that illuminate how we form, understand, and manipulate conceptual categories. WINTER, supra note 18, 
at 77 84 (describing structural, neurological, and cross-cultural bases for concept models); MURPHY, BBOC, 
supra note 19, at 41 71; Murphy, What Are Categories and Concepts?, supra note 19, at 16 24 .Whatever their 
origins, conceptual categories seem fundamental to human thought, and the concept models psychologists use to 
describe them are useful in understanding legal categorization, as well. 
 77. The two radial models discussed below (the prototype and exemplar models) are based on similarity. 
These are not the only concept models cognitive psychologists have identified. We also use concept models based 
on, for example, metaphoric, metonymic, and gestalt relationships and we combine those models into more 
complex structures and chains of categorization. Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem 
of Self-Governance, STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1389 (1988). For the reasons discussed below, prototype and exemplar 
models are the most useful for understanding appealability doctrines, and I do not discuss the other models here. 
 78. Murphy, What Are Categories and Concepts?, supra note 19, at 13. 
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A concept is the internal, mental representation or understanding of a category the 
idea in our heads by which we understand a category.80 Concepts are how we identify 
categories and category members. Psychologists have studied how people form concepts 
and understand categories. They have identified common conceptual models that we use 
to understand categories. 
B. Classical Categories Based on Logical Definitions 
-standards dichotomy. The classical view of categories is that every 
81 A classical category is constituted 
by a formal definition (a rule) made up of a set of necessary and sufficient characteristics 
(elements).82
83
If an object has those characteristics, then it meets the definition and it is a dog if it does 
not have those characteristics, then it does not meet the definition and it is not a dog.84
In the classical view, the membership of categories is definite, not fuzzy. Because 
classical categories are made up of necessary-and-sufficient definitions, every item either 
does or does not fit within the categorical definition. There are no borderline cases that are 
85 Every item either is a dog, because it has all of the 
characteristics necessary and sufficient to define a dog
more of those necessary and sufficient characteristics. This is not to say that the classical 
view does not allow for unknowns. It is quite possible, in the classical view, not to know 
whether a given item is in a category, but it is not possible for the item to be both in and 
Cognitive psychologists have identified at least three shortcomings of the classical 
view, three ways that it fails to capture how we understand categories.86 First, categories 
are often indefinable we recognize categories even when we cannot formulate a 
definition composed of necessary-and-sufficient characteristics. Second, categories are 
often fuzzy we recognize borderline items that are both inside and outside some 
categories. Third, categories are often graded even within a given category, we recognize 
87 None of these traits can be adequately explained 
                                                          
 80. Murphy, What Are Categories and Concepts?, supra note 19, at 13. 
 81. Johnson, supra note 19, at 848. 
82. Murphy, What Are Categories and Concepts?, supra note 19, at 13. 
 83. Johnson, supra note 19, at 848. Different cognitive theories use different terminology. For this article, I 
ha
84. Id.
 85. MURPHY, BBOC, supra note 19, at 15. 
86. Id. at 17 22. 
 87. These are not the only shortcomings that psychologists have identified with the classical view. Another 
display intransitivity when: A is in category B; B is in category C; but A is not in category C. For example: Big 
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by the classical view of categories. 
Categories are often indefinable. The classical view of categories is based on 
logical definitions consisting of necessary and sufficient characteristics. But in real life our 
concepts of categories often do not work that way. The canonical example of this 
down to a set of necessary and sufficient characteristics.88 No set of characteristics
competition, amusement, winning and losing, an element of luck, an element of skill, 
etc. is necessary and sufficient to define a category consisting of everything from chess 
to poker to tennis to ring-around-the-rosy to double Dutch to Dungeons & Dragons. And 
yet, even though we cannot formulate a definition made up of necessary and sufficient 
characteristics that accurately encompass every kind of game, we know what a game is 
and what items fit in the 
, 89
classical categorical reasoning, but a strength of human conceptual thought. We can 
conceptualize logical, classical categories but we can also conceptualize other kinds of 
categories. 
On reflection, many intuitive categorical understandings work this way. For the 
 identify various defining characteristics: has fur, has four 
legs, is domesticated, etc. And, each of those characteristics probably does go into our 
fur, and dogs who are wild. We, of course, know what a dog is but we do not do so 
because we have a single set of necessary and sufficient characteristics for the category 
90 Similarly, although we all know what counts as a vegetable, it turns out there is 
no set of necessary-and-sufficient characteristics to define the category of vegetables.91
Indeed, biologically- 92
Categories are often fuzzy. A necessary feature of the classical view is that, because 
classical categories rely on the either/or logic of necessary and sufficient characteristics, 
classical categories have strict boundaries and no borderline cases. Although there are 
rigorously logical categories with clear boundaries made up of necessary and sufficient 
characteristics
most of our useful categories do not work that way. Indeed, when you read in the previous 
paragr
93 In 
the real world, boundaries between our conceptions of categories are much fuzzier than 
                                                          
furniture; but car seats are not furniture. Id. at 38. This phenomenon is not possible under the classical view, 
which allows only for sets and subsets of categories. 
 88. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 66 77 (1951). 
 89. 
cognitive psychology theories. Id. at § 70. 
 90. MURPHY, BBOC, supra note 19, at 17. 
 91. Lynne Peskoe-Yang, Vegetables Don’t Exist, POPULA (Feb. 20, 2019), 
https://popula.com/2019/02/20/vegetables-dont-exist/; Henry Nicholls, Do Vegetables Really Exist?, BBC (Oct. 
17, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20150917-do-vegetables-really-exist. 
 92. Peskoe-Yang, supra note 91; Nicholls, supra note 91. 
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the classical view suggests. A chair is different from a loveseat, which is different from a 
sofa but where exactly is the line between them?94 The boundaries of categories are not 
as clear as a set of necessary and sufficient conditions would make them.95 Borderline 
cases (like tomatoes and loveseats) often arise that cannot be accounted for by the either/or 
Categories are often “graded.” Cognitive psychologists have also observed that 
people share an intuitive sense that not all members of a category are equally part of the 
96 Similarly, 
97 This is a different phenomenon from categorical 
striches and 
penguins definitely are birds, and people recognize that.98 And yet we mostly agree that 
membership is graded cannot be explained by the either/or logic of the classical view. 
Under the classical view, there is no differentiating among the items within a given 
category all the items that exhibit all the necessary and sufficient characteristics for a 
category are equally in that category. 
Those three shortcomings of the classical view (that categories are indefinable, 
fuzzy, and graded) also suggest another trait of categories for which the classical view, at 
least implicitly, fails to account: categories depend on context and purpose. We do not 
conceptualize categories in a vacuum. We do so for a reason. Remember, a category is a 
99 One answer to whether a tomato is 
a vegetable or a fruit might be that it depends on whether you are preparing a salad (where 
fruit). Why you are making the category matters to your conception of the category 
itself.100
C. Conceptual Categories Based on Similarity and Typicality 
Based on experimental observation, cognitive psychologists have created conceptual 
models of how we conceptualize categories. Two such models are the prototype model 
                                                          
 94. Lawrence M. Solan, Legislative Style and Judicial Discretion: The Case of Guardianship Law, 35 INT L
J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 464, 467 (2012). 
 95. 
objects), there is no clear dividing line where a few 
objects become a heap and, indeed, the very idea that adding or removing one object from the pile could make 
the difference is nonsensical. 
 96. Solan, supra note 94, at 467 (citing Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Reference Points, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
532 (1975) [hereinafter Rosch, Reference Points]); MURPHY, BBOC, supra note 19, at 21 22 (citing Eleanor 
Rosch, Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories, 104 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 193 (1975)); 
WINTER, supra note 18, at 76 77. 
 97. WINTER, supra note 18, at 76 (citing Rosch, Reference Points, supra note 96); Solan, supra note 94, at 
467 (discussing S.L. Armstrong, L.R. Gleitman & H. Gleitman, What Some Concepts Might Not Be, 13 
COGNITION 263 (1983)). 
 98. Solan, supra note 94, at 467. 
 99. Murphy, What Are Categories and Concepts?, supra note 19, at 12. 
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and the exemplar model. Both models rely on a fundamental insight: we do not 
conceptualize category membership based on logical binary choices, we think of 
categories based on our senses of similarity and typicality. 
Similarity and Typicality. To explain how human conceptual categories can be 
indefinable, fuzzy, and graded, modern concept theory embraces the principles of 
similarity and typicality. Where classical categories are defined by the necessary and 
sufficient characteristics of classical definitions, conceptual categories are shaped by how 
similar items are to the typical member(s) of the category.
Once again, Wittgenstein provides the canonical example and explanation. To 
crisscr 101 He 
family. Imagine that: the father, son, and daughter (but not the mother) have similar eye 
colors; the mother, son, and daughter (but not the father) have similar hair colors; the 
mother, father, and daughter (but not the son) have similar nose shapes; the daughter and 
father (but not the son and mother) are similar heights; the mother and son (but not the 
father and daughter) are similarly athletic; etc. Although there is no identifiable 
characteristic or set of characteristics that they all share (no necessary and sufficient 
element by which to identify members of the family), the family members do have shared 
features. They resemble each other and can be recognized as part of the same family 
because they all 
102 Wittgenstein likened these similarities to the individual strands that 
make up a length of rope.103 Although no single strand runs the entire length of the rope, 
they overlap enough that they form a unified object. 
Just as shared features mark different people as a single family, and as overlapping 
strands make up a rope, overlapping shared features among items can mark them as part 
of the same category, even when no single characteristic is shared by all the category 
members. Unlike the members of a classical category, which each exhibit every defining 
characteristic the members of a conceptual category can share some, but not necessarily 
all, of the same features. They are not identical, but they are similar. 
From this principle of similarity, cognitive psychologists have derived the principle 
of typicality, which refers to how similar an item is to the prototypical category 
member(s).104 The principle of typicality essentially a measure of the strength of 
similarity allows modern concept theory to explain how categories can be graded. Items 
with more, or more significant, similar features are more typical, while items with fewer 
well. A robin is a more typical examples of a bird than an ostrich. But similar to what, 
exactly? What anchors a conceptual category to give some structure to it? Why is a robin 
more typical than an ostrich? That is where the prototype and exemplar models come in. 
                                                          
 101. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 88, at § 66. 
 102. Id.
 103. Id. at § 67. 
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1. The Prototype Concept Model 
The prototype model of concept-formation posits that our concept of a category is 
based on a conceptual prototype, an ideal member of the category.105 The prototype is the 
most typical member of a category, the member that, in our heads, represents and thereby 
constitutes the category.106 Prototypical concepts are structured radially around a single 
prototype that we think of as the quintessential category-member. 107 A prototypical 
concept can also be based on a negative prototype an item that is definitely not part of 
the category, that we think of as the opposite. Thus, we decide whether an item is in a 
prototypically structured category based on similarity, by asking how its salient features 
resemble the prototype and differ from the negative prototype.108
The prototype model explains the traits of categories discussed above that the 
-and-
sufficient definitions with similarity to positive and negative prototypes, the prototype 
model explains how conceptual categories are indefinable. When items share enough 
features with the positive prototype and do not share many features with the negative 
even though the category members do not all share the same necessary and sufficient 
elements, and we cannot reduce that knowledge to a logical or verbal definition. 
By focusing on similarity and typicality, this model also explains how conceptual 
categories can be fuzzy and graded. Categories are fuzzy because items that are equally 
similar to a positive and a negative prototype (or that are similar to both, but in different 
respects) are borderline category members, giving rise to fuzzy categories.109 Categories 
are graded because the more typical an item is i.e., the more features it shares with the 
prototype (and the fewer it shares with the negative prototype) the better it fits the 
category.110
2. The Exemplar Concept Model 
Although the prototype model provides a better explanation of human concept-
making than the classical view by accounting for indefinability, fuzziness, and gradation, 
it may still be too simplistic to explain complex conceptual categories. Like the classical 
view, the prototype model is still based on a single summary representation. Like a 
classical definition, a prototype is a single summary idea that we imagine constituting the 
                                                          
 105. Eleanor Rosch & Carolyn B. Mervis, Family Resemblances: Studies in the Internal Structure of 
Categories, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 573, 574 (1975). 
 106. Johnson, supra
they understa
107. Id. at 867. 
 108. Rosch & Mervis, supra note 105, at 586. 
 109. MURPHY, BBOC, supra note 19, at 31. 
110. Id. ( T]ypicality is a graded phenomenon, in which items can be extremely typical (close to the 
prototype), moderately typical (fairly close), atypical (not close) and finally borderline category members (things 
that are about equally distant from two different pr
graded-ness. Even concepts that are not structured prototypically can be graded. For example, the category of 
Odd Numbers is constituted by a classical definition, but experiments have shown that we think of some odd 
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entire category. Just as the classical view categorizes an item by comparing it to the 
definition, prototype theory categorizes an item by comparing it to the positive and 
negative prototypes. And just as we sometimes cannot formulate a definition for a 
category, sometimes we cannot identify a single item that serves as a prototype for a 
category, even though we can conceptualize the category.
A potentially more powerful concept model is provided by the exemplar model. The 
exemplar model rejects the idea that people have a single, summary representation that 
encompasses an entire concept.111
summary representation of the whole category and use that to decide category 
represented by specific exemplars, and categorization involves comparing an item to all 
112 To dete
compare it to a single idealized idea of a bird in our heads, we compare it to many examples 
of birds. The exemplar model, thus, accounts for the possibility that we can conceptualize 
a category even if we cannot conceive of a single prototypical member. But it also retains 
the explanatory potency of similarity and typicality (applied not through comparison to a 
single prototype but to multiple exemplars) and thus accounts for categorical fuzziness and 
gradation just as the prototype model does. 
In sum, we conceptualize categories both classically and conceptually. Classical 
categories are composed of definitions made up of necessary-and-sufficient 
characteristics. Conceptual categories are composed of radial structures made up of 
prototype and exemplar models based on similarity and typicality. Classical categories 
draw on the formal logic and either/or structure of elemental rules to definitively determine 
category membership. Conceptual categories employ a standard-like weighing of various 
factors to determine category membership in fuzzier, less definitive terms. Accordingly, 
classical categories are (like rules) more predictable, while conceptual categories are (like 
standards) more flexible. 
D. Legal Conceptual Categories 
Categories appear throughout the law. As Karl Llewellyn observed nearly 100 years 
ehavior is too heterogeneous to be dealt with except after some artificial ordering. 
The sense impressions which make up what we call observation are useless unless gathered 
113 In short, for law to 
govern human activities, it must categorize them, and in order to categorize activities, we 
s, concepts are not to be eliminated; 
                                                          
 111. MURPHY, BBOC, supra note 19, at 49 (
). 
112. Id.
that people learn a summary representation of the whole category and use that to decide category membership. 
Category learning involves the formation of that prototype, and categorization involves comparing an item to the 
prototype representation. The other v
; id.
it is not that easy to tell the models apart. The reason for this is that under many circumstances, the models make 
.
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114 Only by dividing the multitude of worldly phenomena (people, 
organizations, political entities, actions, statements, beliefs, etc.) into separate categories 
can the law then act on them. Lawyers ar
legal categories giving rise to liability, like negligence or fraud. Judges and juries rule on 
whether the conduct fits in those categories. Legislators pass laws that set the categories 
(the edges of which lawyers and judges then test and reshape through creative 
interpretation and precedent). 
Both the classical view of categories and the conceptual model of categories have 
their places in law and legal practice. The classical view has an intuitive appeal, especially 
for lawyers.115 Classical rules and definitions appear throughout the law.116 They have 
the same advantages as rules: predictability and clarity. Every first-year student learns that 
the common law tort of negligence has four elements: duty, breach, causation, and 
damages. That is a classical definition of negligence consisting of four necessary and 
sufficient characteristics. That definition determines which conduct falls within the 
classical category of negligent conduct. If a certain course of conduct exhibits those four 
definitional elements, then that conduct is negligent. If it does not, then it is not. 
This is not to say the classical view is simplistic. The necessary and sufficient 
characteristics that define a classical category can be related to one another with formal 
logical rules, giving rise to more complex definitions and rules.117 Adding IF THEN 
rules, BUT IF THEN exceptions, and Boolean AND/OR connectors to the classical four-
element definition of negligence creates a system of logical rules to determine liability for 
defendant is liable; BUT IF the plaintiff assumed the risk, THEN the defendant is not 
liable; BUT IF the plaintiff is a minor AND the plaintif
view of categorization is capable of significant complexity and nuance. 
But, because any system of classical definitional categories is necessarily built on 
nested, binary true/false determinations, it cannot describe all legal doctrines. Just as law 
students learn the basic definition of negligence, they also learn (often to their frustration) 
that classical categorical definitions frequently fail to fully capture the complexity of the 
-dependent, and fuzzy 
                                                          
 114. Id.
 115. See WINTER, supra note 18, at 8
i.e., classical, view). Why the classical view is intuitively attractive is the subject of debate. The formality of the 
logic that it enables is particularly useful and attractive to philosophers because it creates a bounded and 
manipulatable object, the concept, for philosophical examination. Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence, Concepts,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. ARCHIVE (Edwad N. Zalta ed., Spring 2014), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/concepts/. Some cognitive scientists attribute the appeal of the 
classical view to its metaphorical similarity to the real-world experience of sorting real objects into containers
an embodied experience that enables a metaphoric understanding of otherwise abstract analytical thought. See 
Johnson, supra note 19, at 858 59; WINTER, supra note 18, at 62 64; see generally LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra 
note 76.  
116. See Solan, supra note 94, at 466. 
 117. and
missed OR it must pass above the knees and below the armpits and over home plate without being hit OR the 
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question.118 The classical view of categories cannot accommodate that fuzziness and 
ambiguity. A system of legal directives made up only of classical definitions and strict 
rules risks arbitrariness and inflexibility to the needs of real-world legal problems. 
Fortunately, just as legal doctrines use standards to provide the flexibility lacking in 
strict rules, they use conceptual categories when classical definitions prove too rigid. 
Prototypical thinking and prototypically structured categories are fundamental parts of the 
common law. The category of legal harm, for example, is intuitively structured around a 
prototype of physical bodily harm. We conceive of other kinds of legal harm (emotional, 
financial, dignitary, etc.) based on their (degrees of) resemblance to the prototypical 
physical harms.119
property (chattel, stocks and bonds, intellectual property, etc.) based on their varying 
degrees of resemblance to the central prototype.120
Exemplar-based categories are also a key component of the common law tradition. 
Many common-law doctrines exhibit greater structure and predictability than pure 
standards but have not been reduced to clear definitions or rules. Those doctrines are 
developed and elucidated through the accumulation of precedent. Such doctrines 
essentially provide that a particular category of cases should be treated similarly, with the 
category constituted by a constellation of exemplary precedents. To t]reat like cases 
121 judges look first at the exemplary precedents and then, even if those precedents 
do not provide a clear definition for the category, assess whether the case at hand fits that 
category by gauging its meaningful similarity to the existing precedents. 
The doctrine for determining personal jurisdiction over corporations provides a 
familiar example from the first year of law school. The requirement from International 
Shoe v. Washington  have certain minimum contacts with [the forum 
is a vague, general standard.122 The International Shoe opinion 
provides some guidance as to how the standard should be applied (paying attention to both 
the nature and degree of contacts, for example), but it does not provide a clear rule or 
definition describing the category of defendants that it subjects to personal jurisdiction.123
                                                          
 118. HART, supra note 79, at 125 27; H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 593, 606 15 (1957); see also Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park 
Symposium: The Hart-Fuller Debate at Fifty, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109 (2008). 
 119. Johnson, supra note 19, at 851; see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, Right to Privacy, HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193 95 (1890) (describing the development of legal protections for dignitary and other intangible 
harms, and for intellectual and other intangible property, from concrete physical harms and real property). 
 120. Johnson, supra
rope exam
necessary and sufficient charact See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Trademark 
as a Property Right, 107 KY. L. REV. 3 (2017). 
 121. HART, supra note 79 . . . consists of two parts: a uniform or constant feature, 
 122. Int l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
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Subsequent cases provided more clarity, sometimes in the form of definitive rules, but 
more often because each case serves as an exemplar of the kind of corporate defendant 
that is or is not subject to personal jurisdiction. When deciding if there is personal 
jurisdiction 
contacts with the state and asks whether they are more like the positive exemplars where 
there was personal jurisdiction (International Shoe’s salesmen in Washington124 and 
Burger King’s franchise contract governed by Florida law125) or more like the negative 
exemplars where there was no personal jurisdiction (World-Wide Volkswagen’s car in 
Oklahoma,126 Asahi Metal Industry’s tire valve in California,127 and J. McIntyre 
Machinery v. Nicastro’s metal-shearing machine in New Jersey128). In doing so, a judge 
will identify the salient features of each case and note how similar or dissimilar they are 
to the case at hand.129
These uses of prototype and exemplar concept models in law owe something to the 
prevalence of analogical reasoning in legal thinking. Arguments for the use of concept 
models in the law will, therefore, find support in arguments for analogical reasoning in the 
law. Legal scholars have long recognized the centrality of analogies to legal thought and 
the development of the common-law.130 By drawing analogies to prior cases, lawyers 
argue for, and judges provide, similar treatment in current cases. Analogical reasoning 
depends on recognizing similarity between different cases, as do the prototype and 
exemplar models. Commentators disagree about how legal analogical reasoning works. 
Some argue that analogies necessarily require an intervening rule that makes two different 
cases similar, but others argue that lawyers and judges can and should reason from 
analogies without articulating, or consciously recognizing, an intervening rule.131 Those 
who believe analogies always require articulable intervening rules typically decry 
analogical reasoning, seeing analogies as essentially incomplete syllogisms. Those who 
believe analogies do not require articulable rules typically celebrate analogical reasoning 
because it reveals underlying connections between cases that are not, or not yet, 
apparent.132
Cass Sunstein, for example, argues that analogies are useful precisely because they 
                                                          
124. See generally id.
 125. See generally Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 126. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 127. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 128. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 129. This is essentially what Justice Thomas did when writing for a unanimous court finding no personal 
jurisdiction in Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014). 
130. See generally Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of 
Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996); Brian N. Larson, Law’s Enterprise: Argumentation 
Schemes & Legal Analogy, 87 U. CIN. L. REV. 663 (2018); Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Analogy, 
Expertise, and Experience Symposium: Developing Best Practices for Legal Analysis, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 249 
(2017); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993). 
 131. Schauer & Spellman, supra note 130, at 251 57; Larson, supra note 130, at 681 83. Among the detractors 
of the analogical reasoning in the law are: FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 96 100 (2009); 
Brewer, supra note 130, at 962 77 (expressing doubts about the independent utility of analogical reasoning and 
arguing that they always depend on inherent, unspoken rules). Among the champions of analogical reasoning 
are: LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON 11 13 (2016); Sunstein, supra note 130, at 290 91. 
132. See Schauer & Spellman, supra note 130, at 251 58, and Larson, supra note 130, at 674 75 (both 
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allow legal practitioners to draw connections that are incompletely theorized (not fixed in 
a given rule).133 Using incompletely theorized connections to decide cases can have 
certain advantages. It (1) helps efficiently decide cases without having to formulate rules 
beyond the needs of the case itself, (2) provides precedential guideposts for subsequent 
cases, but (3) does not fix legal doctrines in stone before they are fully developed, leaving 
room for subsequent cases to expand or contract them.134 Analogies based on 
incompletely theorized reasoning provide a kind of bounded flexibility, while leaving open 
the possibility of eventually coalescing into more bounded rules as the doctrine develops. 
That feature of analogical reasoning that it enables intuitive connections and 
parallels between cases is also present in conceptual category-making. As we have seen, 
for cognitive psychologists, the strength of concept models is they can describe categories 
that are not amenable to classical definitions or articulable rules. Similarly, conceptual 
categories are useful for deciding cases flexibly, without committing to a classical 
definition. But they also leave room for the doctrine to evolve in the future, and for loosely 
described conceptual categories to develop into classically defined categories and rules. 
There are some arguments against using conceptual categories in law, but they do 
not mean we should, or can, do away with conceptual categories entirely. They mean we 
need to think carefully about when and how we use them. 
it just repeat the formal rules-vs.-
categories defined by rules and conceptual categories just categories defined by standards? 
Although this critique has some force when it comes to classical categories and rules (a 
classical definition with necessary and sufficient characteristics is essentially a rule with 
required elements), it misses two points when it comes to conceptual categories. One, it 
oversimplifies how conceptual categories work. They are not abstract principles like 
reasonableness, fairness, or justice; they are radial models that explain how we use a
particular abstract principle to build categories based on concrete anchors of specific 
prototypes and exemplars.135 Two, psychologically speaking, recognizing similarity 
comes before either rules or standards. We recognize similarity and assess typicality in an 
intuitive and incompletely theorized way, even when we cannot formulate rules and 
standards. Often, when we do formulate rules or standards to explain our categorical 
understandings, they are retroactive back-formations or justifications for a similarity we 
recognize intuitively.136 As Sunstein explains in defense of analogical thinking, this 
openness to untheorized recognition of similarity makes conceptual categories powerfully 
adaptable.137
                                                          
 133. Sunstein, supra note 130, at 754. 
134. Id.
 135. One might argue that reasonableness, fairness and justice are not just vague standards, but rather are 
informed by experience and familiarity with prior cases and the law. Quite so. But that amounts to arguing that 
they are conceptual categories, based on exemplars of prior cases. 
 136. categories for different 
doctrinal forms. As discussed above, they resist specific definitions, but we know intuitively what we mean by 
each, based on prototypical examples like speed limits and driving safely. 
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fuzziness and adaptability of conceptual categories for the determinacy and predictability 
of rules and classical definitions?138 This argument asserts that law needs greater 
essentialism (reliance on necessary and sufficient conditions) to protect individual rights, 
and that doctrines that give judges too much discretion give them too much power.139 But 
it goes too far when it calls for doing away with conceptual categories entirely in favor of 
purely essentialist definitions. First, even if it were normatively preferable for laws to use 
only bright-line rules and classical definitions, that does not describe the history of the law 
as we know it. As we have seen, even the brightest lines get blurred by unanticipated new 
developments and motivated parties and judges. Second, this normative argument 
essentially echoes the traditional arguments for rules and against standards, and thus it 
repeats the rules-standards dialectic. There are, to be sure, areas of law where bright lines 
and classically defined categories work better than conceptual categories. But that does 
not mean that they are universally superior just as law needs both rules and standards, it 
needs both classical and conceptual categories. 
What about a potential third critique (the mirror image of the second): If legal 
doctrines inevitably shift over time, why require even the flexible structure of concept 
models? Why not use pure standards and unfettered discretion? The same descriptive and 
normative responses apply to this critique as to the previous one. Once again, descriptively, 
that is not how the law has evolved. Lawmakers and judges inevitably and necessarily 
have developed more and less rigorously structured categories over time. And 
normatively, this is another turn in the rules-standards dialectic and all the traditional 
responses in favor of bright-line rules apply. There are areas of law where open-ended 
standards are more desirable than even the loosely-structured concept models. But that 
does not mean unfettered discretion is always better. 
As these last two critiques demonstrate, the concept-model approach can be placed 
in opposition to both rules and standards. That not only underscores the response to the 
first critique, that conceptual categories are not just standards in another guise. It also 
suggests that an understanding of conceptual categories adds something new to the rules-
standards dialectic. As we have seen, the rules-standards continuum illustrates that law 
need not consist only of determinate logical rules or freewheeling discretionary standards; 
many legal doctrines combine aspects of both. Concept models using prototypes and 
exemplars help explain how those doctrines do so, how they can be flexible but not 
unbounded, structured but not rigid. While concept models do not resolve the rules-
standards dialectic, they do identify patterns of decision making and doctrinal form that, 
well deployed, can capture the strengths of both rules and standards. 140
                                                          
138. See, e.g. Against Imperialism in Legal Concepts, 17 U.N.H. L. REV. 67 (2018) 
(arguing that legal doctrines should be constituted only based only on essential elements). 
 139. See, e.g., id.
140. See WINTER, supra ition that human rationality is grounded in experience 
requires rejection of both the determinacy aspired to by analytic logic and the arbitrariness assumed by most 
 (emphasis omitted). Further,  
Developments in cognitive theory make it possible to talk about innovation and constraint free from 
the distorting grip of these objectivist assumptions. True, legal materials do not produce patterns that 
conform to the rationalist expectations of precision, hierarchy, and determinacy. But it does not follow 
that law is indeterminate; we may just be looking for the wrong patterns. Propositional legal rules 





      05/15/2020   10:30:18
42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 33 Side B      05/15/2020   10:30:18
C M
Y K
HEPPNER, R - FINAL FOR PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/6/2020 4:09 PM 
420 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:395 
Very well, one might say, concept models and categories have their place in the law, 
and they can be useful for understanding some legal doctrines. But why this place? How 
do they help us understand appealability? I believe they are both descriptively and 
normatively helpful. They add an important dimension to our description of the federal 
appealability doctrines. And they can provide normative guidance for future doctrinal 
development where the current appealability doctrines are in flux. 
An understanding of categories and concepts helps describe the present state and the 
history of the federal appealability doctrines. A description of the appealability doctrines 
should also be able to describe how they change over time and how judges actually decide 
cases. As explained further below, those doctrinal changes and many of the unspoken 
judicial decisions happen at the initial categorical step. The categorical approach 
accounts for the initial categorization question and the two-step process for deciding 
appealability. It also supplements and clarifies the one-dimensional rules-standards 
continuum. Additionally, the categorical approach explains the judicial and scholarly 
dissatisfaction with the doctrine of finality. 
Take, for example, the typical complaints about the final-judgment rule and the idea 
of finality: that it is hard to define, that it is fuzzy with borderline cases. These criticisms 
echo the shortcomings of the classical categorical view (or, put another way, they reflect 
the mismatch between the idea of finality and the classical categorical form). The 
141 reflects the fact that radial 
categories elude definition and are graded (with more typical members more strongly 
resembling 
142 143 echoes the way radial categories 
are fuzzy with marginal members that are equally similar to negative prototypes and 
exemplars. As explained further below, that is because finality is not a purely rational idea 
defined by a classical category, it is a radial concept. For a description to capture the 
contours of a concept like finality-for-appeal, not to mention describing what courts have 
actually been doing, it needs to consider the categorical dimension. 
The conceptual approach can also provide normative guidance when it comes to 
appealability, suggesting potential directions for doctrinal reform, particularly about 
finality-for-appeal. First, the conceptual approach calls into question the efficacy and 
inevitability of a categorical step in any appealability decision, along with the historical 
evidence that judges and parties will reshape categories to meet perceived needs, means 
that an edict directing judges to decide finality-for-appeal issues categorically (without 
further guidance as to how to formulate categories) will not meaningfully limit the 
innovations around the idea of finality. It will only lead to more circumlocutory 
interpretations and innovations, and more costly litigation to try to fix the fuzzy boundaries 
                                                          
different pattern of decisionmaking. As I argue in chapter 6, much of the perceived indeterminacy of 
law results from the superimposition of a rationalist model for law upon a much more complex process 
of human reasoning. 
Id. at 11; see also Solan, supra note 94, at 468 71. 
 141. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974). 
 142. Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 26 (1945). 
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of various categories. Second, a conceptual approach that acknowledged the inevitability 
of categorical flexibility but channeled judicial innovation through conceptual categories 
would be superior to an ineffective ban on judicial reinterpretation of the finality-for-
appeal doctrines. If the Court provided more conceptual guidance, without trying to shut 
down innovation entirely, it would encourage the continued development of the finality-
for-appeal doctrines, including eventually enabling their solidification into classically 
defined categories and clear rules. 
IV. MAPPING APPEALABILITY DOCTRINES BY CATEGORY TYPE
The traditional rules-standards continuum in Figure 1 can be expanded by adding a 
categorical dimension. As explained, each appealability doctrine has two steps: a 
categorization step and an application step. The rules-standard continuum focuses on the 
second step, arranging the appealability doctrines horizontally by the extent to which they 
resemble rules or standards. Figure 2, below, adds a second dimension, arranging each 
doctrine vertically by the extent to which it employs a classical or conceptual category at 
the first step. 
This Part (IV) examines the exemplary doctrines in each quadrant, beginning with 
the Classical Rules in the upper right quadrant and proceeding counterclockwise around 
the matrix to discuss Classical Standards and Conceptual Standards. The next Part (V) 
discusses the finality-for-appeal doctrines that developed as interpretations of § 
final-judgment rule and how they use concept models of finality. 
A. Doctrines Using Classical Categories 
1. Classical Rules: Final Judgments, Injunctions, and Receiverships 
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appeals, but only from classically defined categories of orders. For a court to find an order 
if it does, then the rule provides that the order is immediately 
appealable. 
a. 28 U.S.C. § 1291: final judgments 
When it comes to appealability, the quintessential classical rule is § so-called
-
144 Formally, the final-judgment rule is a 
simple if-then rule: if a decision is final, then it is immediately appealable. When applied 
to the formal final judgments discussed in this section, it is a classical rule, using a classical 
categorical definition (reinforced by procedural requirements) of finality. In practice, 
when applied in the finality-for-appeal doctrines discussed below in Part V, it is a 
conceptual rule, using conceptual categories to determine finality. 
Most descriptions of the federal appealability doctrines start with the final-judgment 
rule.145
doctrines.146
147 When Congress created 
the circuit courts of appeals in 1891, it granted them appellate jurisdiction over those same 
148
A formal final judgment is the traditional end of the trial-court stage of a case, when 
dispenses with the entire case.149 For formal final judgments, the boundary defining a final 
judgment is marked by a procedural requirement: only entry of the judgment on the docket 
triggers the thirty-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal.150 Indeed, as the idea of 
finality has grown fuzzier, the procedural requirement for formal final judgments has 
become clearer: In 1958, Rule 58(a) was amended to require the district court or clerk to 
enter a judgment on the docket as a separate document.151 Later, Rule 58(c) was added to 
                                                          
 144. 28 U.S.C. § review may be had in the 
Id. 
 145. See, e.g., 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 55, at §§ 3905 14; GREGORY A. CASTANIAS &
ROBERT H. KLONOFF, FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 71 (2d ed. 2017). 
 146. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962). 
 147. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, c.20, §§ 
the practice of English common law courts. 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 55, at § 3906. For 
unclear reasons, the first Judiciary Act applied this final decision requirement to case in both law and equity, 
even though English practice allowed for interlocutory appeals in equity courts. Id.; see also Crick, supra note 
42, at 540 44. 
 148. The Judiciar  6. 
 149. Judgment, BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan Garner ed., 
Final judgment is 
rights of the parties and disposes of all issues in controversy, except for the award of costs (and, sometimes, 
FED. R. CIV. P. 
54(a). 
 150. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a). 
 151. FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a). Rule 58(a) also provides that certain other orders function as judgments but do not 
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direct that, if the court has not entered a separate document, the judgment is deemed 
entered 150 days after the final order was entered.152 These procedural requirements 
definitively establish what counts as a formal final judgment. That certainty allows for the 
final-judgment rule to operate as a classical categorical rule, at least in that specific 
instance: if a decision meets those procedural requirements, then it is immediately 
appealable, regardless of the specific facts or circumstances of the given case. 
b. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and (2) 
Sections 1292(a)(1) and (2) are also classical categorical rules; each uses a classical 
definition to establish a specific category of orders (orders affecting injunctions and 
receiverships) that is immediately appealable.153
Section 1292 owes its origin to perception that strict enforcement of the final-
judgment rule was sometimes unjust or inefficient. In the mid-nineteenth century, the 
Court began to experiment with more flexible interpretations of the rule, giving rise to 
some of the fuzzier finality-for-appeal doctrines discussed below.154 Toward the end of 
the century, Congress stepped in, drafting new rule-like exceptions to the final-judgment 
rule.155 In 1891, Congress passed the first version of § 1292, granting the newly created 
interlocutory 
order[s] or decree[s] granting or continuing . . . 156 Congress was motivated 
-
157 Over time, 
the rule was modified for similar reasons, and the current incarnation, 28 U.S.C. 
§
158
Section 1292(a)(2) originated through a similar process,159 for similar reasons.160
In 1900, Congress passed the precursor161 to § 1292(a)(2), which now grants appellate 
                                                          
 152. FED. R. CIV. P. 58(c). 
 153. Other classical categorical rules include the subject-specific appealability doctrines found in specific 
statutes like the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). 
154. See Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 203 (1848); see generally 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,
supra note 55, at § 3910. 
155. See Dreutzer v. Frankfort Land Co., 65 F. 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1895) (noting that section 7 of the Act of 
1891, the predecessor to § 1292(a)(1)
 156.  7. 
 157. Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83 (1981) (citing Balt. Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 
180 81 (1955)). 
legislative history, although the changes seem plainly to spring from a developing need to permit litigants to 
Balt. Contractors, 348 
U.S. at 181. 
 158. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). For more detailed history of the revisions to § 1292(a)(1), see Carson, 450 U.S. 
at 83 84 n.8; Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822, 829 30 (2d Cir. 1963) (Friendly, 
J., dissenting). 
 159. For legislative history, see 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3925 (3d ed. 2008). 
 160. Id.
.
 161. Act of June 6, 1900, c. 620, 31 Stat. 660. Before it was codified as part of § 1292, the precursor rule 
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appointing receivers, or refusing orders 
to wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as 
dir 162
As with the final-judgment rule itself, there remains some ambiguity about which 
orders §§ 1292(a)(1) and (2) cover (which orders sufficiently involve injunctions and 
receiverships). The Supreme Court has carefully policed the reach of § 1292, approaching 
163 The 
end result is that, for both of these categories of orders, § 1292(a) operates as a rule 
allowing an immediate appeal, with no provision for the exercise of judicial discretion 
based on the specific facts or circumstances of the given case. 
These classical categorical rules have certain traits in common. First, they illustrate 
something that is true of all the appealability rules (including, as shown below, conceptual 
categorical rules): they create a right to appeal. That is to say, when an appealability 
the decision is in the category, then an 
 categorical rules barring appeals. Although some 
categories of orders, like discovery orders, rarely give rise to immediate appeals, there is 
no rule that they are never immediately appealable.164 Even a discovery order could be 
appealable if it also fit into a category from which another doctrine permits an appeal. 
Second, the classical rules illustrate that classical and conceptual categories are 
relative, not absolute they mark the ends of a continuum. And their history shows that 
the positions of doctrines along that continuum are not fixed they change over time. 
Centuries of attorneys and judges motivated to allow or disallow particular appeals have 
pushing classical categories more toward the conceptual end of the continuum. In 
response, rule-makers have revised and added rules, and the Court has cabined 
interpretations to move them more toward classical categorical clarity. (Indeed, the trace 
of a similarity-based conceptual category can be found in § description of 
. . . to take steps to accomplish the purposes [of receiverships], such as directing 
165 Rather than identifying every necessary and 
sufficient characteristic of an order that serves the purpose of a receivership, the definition 
identifies two exemplars and trusts judges to recognize which orders are similar to those). 
Third, the classical rules illustrate two ways that rule-makers and courts try to create 
classical categorical clarity. The evolution of § 1292 demonstrates a definition-writing 
technique: adding words and clarifications to a category description to better describe the 
                                                          
Where, upon a hearing in a district court, or by a judge thereof, in vacation, . . . an interlocutory order 
or decree is made appointing a receiver, or refusing an order to wind up a pending receivership or to 
take the appropriate steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing a sale or other disposal 
of property held thereunder, an appeal may be taken from such interlocutory order or decree to the 
circuit court of appeals. 
 162. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 163. Switz. ., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 24 (1966). 
164. See Steinman, supra note 2, at 1242 
court order is categorically beyond an appellate 
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category it defines. The development of Rule 58 demonstrates a proceduralizing technique: 
rather than revising the § 
requirement and uses that as a bright-line. 
2. Classical Standards: Partial Final Judgments and Class Certification Orders 
Classical appealability standards use discretionary standards to sometimes (on a 
case-by-case basis) permit immediate appeals, but only from classically defined categories 
of orders. For a court to find an order appealable under a classical categorical standard, the 
and, if it does, must 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) permits immediate appeals from partial final 
judgments, and Rule 23(f) permits applications for permission to appeal from class 
certification orders. They both explicitly employ the two-step appealability decision-
making process, and they are both classical categorical appealability standards. 
a. Rule 54(b) 
Rule 54(b) allows an immediate appeal from a partial final judgment an 
-claim case determines that 
166 Thus, Rule 54(b) explicitly 
requires a two-step process. First, the district court must determine whether a given order 
falls into the category of orders eligible to be partial final judgments: orders in a multiclaim 
167 The first 
step employs a classical categorical definition, the second a standard. And that is no 
accident it was a deliberate innovation when Rule 54(b) was amended in 1946.168
Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include liberal joinder provisions 
allowing federal courts to hear complex cases, the original drafters of the Rules felt that a 
more liberal appealability doctrine was needed.169 The solution was Rule 54(b).170 The 
first version of Rule 54(b) authorized district courts to enter appealable partial final 
judgments, if they found that an interloc
                                                          
 166. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 13 (1950) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b)); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). Rule 54(b) was actually p
rulemaking authority, before the 1990 enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) which would seem to specifically 
authorize it. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b), advisory committee  notes to 1946 and 1961 amendments. Rule 54(b) 
was amended again in 1961 to clarify that it applies when a court disposes of a party in a multi-party case, just 
as it applies when a court disposes of a claim in a multi-claim case. FED. R. CIV. P. 54 
notes to 1961 amendments. 
  167.  FED. R. CIV. P. 54. 
 168. FED. R. CIV. P. 54 
 169. Id. e content of the newly 
 in order to avoid the possible injustice of a delay in judgment of a distinctly separate claim 
). 
170. Id.
rulemaking authority, before the 1990 enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) which would seem to specifically 
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particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which 
171 For the first time district courts had explicit authority 
to determine whether a given order should be considered final and appealable. 
That version proved unwieldy because it was hard to tell which issues were 
undecided issues and claims, to warrant immediate appeal.172 It was too fuzzy a standard 
for consistent adjudication. But a strict bright-line rule would not achieve the flexibility 
that was the original impetus for the Rule. Therefore, in 1946, the Rule was amended to 
clarify that district courts could enter appealable partial final judgments only when an 
 in entering judgment.173 The new version broke the appealability inquiry into two 
steps, providing initial rule-like clarity (was a claim decided?) while preserving room for 
case-by-case standard (is there a just reason for delay?) answerable to the needs of justice. 
A pair of cases decided together in 1956, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey and Cold
Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co., illustrate how Rule 54(b) 
crystallized into a two-step, classical categorical standard.174 The question before the 
Court in both cases was whether the amended Rule 54 was consistent with § -
judgment rule. If it were not, the Rule amendment would be impermissible, because 
Congress had not yet granted the Court authority to write rules declaring non-final orders 
appealable. 
In Sears, Roebuck, Justice Burton, writing for a seven-Justice majority, held that the 
§ -decision 
requirement.175 The majority held that a decision resolving an entire claim was final as to 
that claim.176 Accordingly, the Court held in Sears, Roebuck that a partial judgment on 
two of six claims was immediately appealable, and it held in Cold Metal Process that a 
partial judgment on a counterclaim was immediately appealable.177 Pointing to the history 
of the Rule and the 1946 amendment, the majority opinion treated the decides-a-claim 
requirement as a necessary and sufficient feature to both define the category of decisions 
on could be understood as a 
prototype model of finality, reasoning that decisions deciding entire claims were enough 
                                                          
 171. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 432 34 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b)). 
 172. FED. R. CIV. P.  to 1946 amendment. 
173. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (1946); FED. R. CIV. P. . Rule 
54(b) was amended again in 1961 to clarify that it applies when a court disposes of a party in a multi-party case, 
just as it applies when a court disposes of a claim in a multi-claim case. FED. R. CIV. P. 54 advisory com
note to 1961 amendment. 
 174. Sears, Roebuck, 351 U.S. at 434 36; Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng r & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 
445, 449 53 (1956). 
175. Sears, Roebuck, 351 U.S. at 435, 437 (noting in passing that the validity of the original version of the 
176. Id. at 436; see Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 
 a 
n of an individual 
Sears, Roebuck, 351 U.S. at 436). 
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like prototypical final decisions that they should be categorized as final.178 But the 
majority did not adopt a prototype model. Instead, using the decides-a-claim requirement 
as a necessary-and-sufficient condition, the Court created a category with a classical 
definition. And so, the first step of the analysis categorizing a decision as a final 
judgment became the application of a classical definition, while the second step
determining whether there was just reason for delay in the case remained a case-by-case 
standard. Thus, 54(b) became a classical categorical standard. 
In his dissenting and concurring opinions, Justice Frankfurter objected that the 
 holding could not be squared with the prior understanding of finality. 
Frankfurter would have held instead that a decision was final only if it comported with the 
§ 1291 
meaning that even 
a fully decided claim had to be separable from the remainder of the case before it could be 
considered final.179 stence that § 
§ 1291 
180
categorical nature of the final-judgment rule. While Frankfurter would have treated finality 
under § 1291 as a conceptual category, based on a particular purpose and a prototypical 
ined category 
with ascertainable boundaries.181
                                                          
 178. In order to make this declaration, the Court recharacterized the prior understanding of finality as merely 
general practice that, in multiple claim actions, all the claims had to be finally decided before an 
Sears, Roebuck, 351 U.S. at 434 (emphasis 
added). The Court then -decision 
requirement itself. Id. at 436.
 179. Id. at 441 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For Frankfurter, courts making that determination had to apply a 
-and-
Id. at 443 44. Years later, in Curtiss-Wright, the Court 
reintroduced the separability concerns that motivated Frankfurter, holding that separability was a permissible 
consideration in the second part of the Rule 54(b) certification process, when determining that there was no just 
reason for delay. 446 U.S. at 8. 
 180. Sears, Roebuck, 351 U.S. at 439 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Frankfurter listed various ways the Court 
could have acknowledged and explained the contradiction between Rule 54(b) and the prior conception of 
finality: 
The Court could have said that Rule 54(b), promulgated under congressional authority and having the 
force of statute, has qualified 28 U.S.C. § 1291. It does not say so. The Court could have said that it 
rejects the reasoning of the decisions in which this Court for over a century has interpreted § 1291 as 
expressing a hostility toward piecemeal appeals. It does not say so. The Court could have said that 
determine the content of finality. The Court does not say that either. 
Id.
 181. Id. at 441. Arguably, what Frankfurter would have done explicitly treated § 1291 as a prototypical 
category and asked whether rulings under 54(b) were enough like the prototype at the center of § 1291 to be 
considered final the majority did implicitly. Instead of acknowledging that it was treating orders subject to Rule 
54(b) like final decisions, the majority insisted that they actually are final decisions. As discussed below, the 
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b. Rule 23(f) 
Like Rule 54(b), Rule 23(f) uses a two-step, classical categorical standard, applying 
a standard to a defined category of orders, namely orders granting or denying class 
certification.182
183 Rule 23(f) provides no criteria 
for when the appellate court should grant an appeal (although courts have identified some 
non-exclusive factors to consider).184 The upshot is that class certification orders are 
eligible for appeal, but only if the appellate court determines, on a discretionary, case-by-
case basis, that an appeal is warranted. 
Because Rule 23(f) was enacted pursuant to explicit statutory authority allowing the 
compatibility with § 1291 as Rule 54(b).185 But its origins illustrate that same tension. In 
the 1960s, appellate courts began to experiment with a new finality-for-appeal doctrine in 
-
granting or denying class certification in class action cases.186 The courts reasoned that, 
because class-certification grants often spurred settlement and class-certification denials 
often prompted plaintiffs to drop their cases,187 the certification decision often sounded 
188 So the 
c
when a class-certification order would likely induce a party to give up before final 
judgment. 
In 1978, the Supreme Court put a stop to this relaxation of the final-judgment rule 
in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay
dual fairness 
unappealable.189 Instead, the Court urged courts to use their discretion under § 1292(b) to 
permit interlocutory appeals of class certification orders.190
Using § 1292(b), however, proved ineffective, and the Court used its rulemaking 
power191 in 1998 to adopt Rule 23(f) allowing parties to petition for immediate appeal 
                                                          
 182. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
183. Id.
 184. An influential early Rule 23(f) case by Judge Easterbrook identified three non-exclusive considerations: 
certification would exert undue pressure to settle; and whether permitting an appeal would advance the 
development of the law. Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 1999). Other courts have 
largely followed suit. See 16 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra 159, at § 3931.1 n.14. 
 185. FED. R. CIV. P see 28 U.S.C. § 1292. 
 186. 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 55, at § 3912. 
 187. Id.
 188. Id.
189. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 473 (1978). 
190. Id. at 473 75. For a discussion of discretionary interlocutory appeals under § 1292(b), see infra Part 
IV.B.1. 
 191. In the 1990s, Congress granted the Supreme Court explicit rulemaking authority to make previously 
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from class certification orders.192 Rule 23(f) does not create a right to appeal from a class 
certification decision. It merely permits a party to ask the appellate court for permission to 
cretion exercised by the 
193 Although the committee expected 
the courts of appeals to develop appealability standards to guide their discretion, it did not 
impose any.194
Both Rule 54(b) and Rule 23(f) the Rules using classical categorical standards
reflect the judicial understanding, developed through years of institutional experience, that 
purely categorical rules fail to meet the efficiency and fairness goals of the appealability 
doctrines: there are categories of decisions that are sometimes, but not always, worth 
immediately appealing. Therefore, these Rules use bright-line procedural mechanisms to 
obtain the either/or certainty as to whether an order fits a category. But they also enjoy the 
flexibility of standards, which can be applied on a discretionary, case-by-case basis. The 
strict classical categories clear a (limited) space for the courts to employ the discretionary 
standards. By limiting the categories of orders to which the standards apply, these classical 
categorical standards limit the risk of freewheeling judicial caprice posed by pure 
discretionary standards. They also allow for courts to develop more specialized standards. 
The standard for deciding appealability within each category can be different, and over 
time the standards can be tailored to the particular kinds of orders to which judges think 
they should apply. 
Classical categorical standards do not have to be rules of procedure (rather than 
statutes or case law), but it is not surprising that these two are found in the Federal Rules. 
The rulemaking process can leverage judicial institutional knowledge to identify 
categories of decisions that could benefit from applying an appealability standard, and it 
can then fix those categories with classical definitions and procedural markers setting their 
limits.195 Placing the requirement in the Federal Rules creates a procedural bright line: 
either the district court has entered a partial final judgment or it has not; either it has entered 
a class certification order or it has not. That procedural clarity reinforces the definitional 
boundaries of the classical categories. 
                                                          
appeal under horized the Court to prescribe rules 
 1292. 28 U.S.C. § 
prescribe rules, in accordance with section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision 
Administration Act of 1992, PL 102 572, October 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4506. 
 192. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 193. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee  notes to 1998 amendment. 
 194. Id. The committee suggested some considerations (whether a certification order would end a particular 
case and whether the case presented novel questions). Id. The courts have largely followed those suggestions, 
while developing their own variations on the standard to apply. See 16 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra 159, 
at § 3931.1 nn.9, 14. 





      05/15/2020   10:30:18
42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 38 Side B      05/15/2020   10:30:18
C M
Y K
HEPPNER, R - FINAL FOR PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/6/2020 4:09 PM 
430 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:395 
B. Doctrines Using Conceptual Categories 
1. Conceptual Standards: Interlocutory Orders 
Not all categories of orders that should sometimes be appealable are fixed or easily 
defined. That is where 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) comes into play. Aside from the appellate 
mandamus doctrine which is best considered an exception to or safety valve from the 
appealability doctrines196 the most flexible of the appealability doctrines is § 1292(b), 
and it employs something like a conceptual standard. Conceptual standards are the most 
amorphous of the appealability doctrines, combining the fuzziness of conceptual 
categories with the flexibility of standards. 
Conceptual appealability standards use discretionary standards to sometimes (on a 
case-by-case basis) permit immediate appeal, but only from conceptually constituted 
categories of orders. For a court to find an order appealable under a conceptual categorical 
and, 
a. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b): Interlocutory Orders 
In 1958, Congress created § 1292(b)197 in response to judicial desire for flexibility 
to alleviate the strict final-judgment rule.198 It permits a party to seek permission in the 
appellate court to appeal from an interlocutory order, but only if the district court first 
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order 
may materially advance the ultimate termination of 199
If the district court makes that certification, then the appellate court decides whether 
decides de novo whether the issue should be immediately appealable.200 When doing the 
former, the appellate court re-applies the standard applied by the district court. When doing 
cir and it can decide not to allow the appeal 
                                                          
 196. The appellate mandamus doctrine permits a discretionary appeal via petition for a writ of mandamus
when a court of appeals determines that the vaguely defined, but quite limited, extraordinary-circumstances 
standard has been met. Id. at 1708 (quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 108 (1967) (Black, J., concurring)) 
, the doctrine permits an 
appellate court to grant a writ of mandamus, and thus hear an appeal from an interlocutory order, when the 
petitioner shows that: (1) it has no other adequate means of obtaining relief; (2) the right to issuance of the writ 
(3) .S. 
Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 81 (2004) (quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 
394, 403 (1976)). This vague, discretionary standard can be applied to any kind of order, unlike the appealability 
doctrines, which apply only to certain categories of orders. 
 197. Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 929 (amended 1958); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
 198. 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 109 n.56 (2d 
ed. 2011); see Hadjipateras v. Pacifica, 290 F. 2d 697, 702 03, n.12 (5th Cir. 1961) (noting that § 1292(b) 
a judge-sought, judge-made, judge-
 199. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
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for any reason including concerns about its own docket congestion.201 Unlike the classical
categorical rules and standards discussed above, § 1292(b) employs a conceptual
categorical question at the first step, before applying a standard at the second. 
Because the appellate court re-applies the same standard as the district court, the 
steps are not split between the trial and appellate courts. The first-step categorization 
quest
legal questions.202 The second-step standard asks whether the question of law is 
-specific determinations, dependent on the 
nature and procedural posture of the particular case.203
At the first step, there is no classical definition for what constitutes a contestable 
question of law. Instead, courts use prototype- and exemplar-based reasoning to identify 
contestable questions. The obvious prototype for a contestable decision is one that could 
be reversed, an incorrect decision.204 But the category of contestable decisions must be 
205 Still, one could imagine an intuitive 
prototype-model centered on the idea of an incorrect decision a graded category, where 
decisions that are likely to be reversed fit the category better than those with little chance 
of reversal. The problem with that prototype model lies in its implementation: It is hard to 
require trial judges to assess their own likelihood of error, and even if they believe an error 
is possible, they may be loath to declare it.206
It is not surprising, therefore, that an exemplar model has evolved to describe the 
category of contestable decisions. The exemplars are other types of decisions with high 
likelihoods of reversal. Courts have developed a rough graded category, where some of 
the exemplars are considered more typical than others. Most courts recognize some 
combination of the following exemplars (in roughly descending order of typicality): 
(1) decisions contrary to holdings in other circuits; (2) decisions where there is a circuit 
split on the question; (3) decisions where there is an intracircuit split at the district court 
                                                          
 201. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978) (quoting Fisons, Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d 
1241, 1248 (7th Cir. 1972)) (b), the appellant still 
has the burden of persuading the court of appeals that exceptional circumstances justify a departure from the 
basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment. .
  202.  28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
203. Id.; see 16 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra 159, at § 3930 nn.24 25, 38 42. 
 204. 
are required by binding precedent, even if they believe they are incorrect on some other grounds. See, e.g., Berger 
v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 795, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
 205. Indeed, truly incorrect decisions that are contrary to controlling precedent are not certifiable under 
§ 1292(b) because there is no grounds for disagreement on them. See, e.g., In re Miedzianowski, 735 F.3d 383, 
384 (6th Cir. 2013) th Cir. 1966)) 
we. Because there is governing precedent in this circuit that settles the issue at hand, Defendants cannot show 
 206. It would be a rare judge, indeed, who would happily opine that there is even a fifty percent chance that 
her decision is wrong. And no judge would opine that it is more than fifty percent likely to be wrong she would 
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level; (4) and decisions on novel questions of law.207
When an interlocutory decision resembles a more-typical exemplar (say, decisions 
where there is a circuit split), courts often find it is a member of the category based on that 
similarity alone.208 But when an interlocutory decision resembles only one of the less-
typical exemplars (say, decisions on novel questions of law), courts are more cautious, 
often noting that something more is needed to fit the category.209
Section 1292(b) demonstrates something interesting about the development of 
categorical appealability doctrines: The more substantively open-ended a doctrine, the 
more courts and rule-makers rely on procedural strictures to bound it. Section 1292(b) is 
vague and discretionary at both the categorization and the standard-application steps. 
Therefore, the procedural requirements are heightened. Both the trial court and the 
appellate court have to agree that the doctrine applies, and the appellate court has to agree 
to take the case. These procedural requirements serve as a backstop to the open-endedness 
of the doctrine itself.210
That is why most of the exemplars of contestable decisions are defined by procedural 
postures or outcomes prior contrary holdings, circuit splits, etc. all depend on how other 
courts have ruled in the past. Courts rely on the clear procedural signs of past contested 
decisions to recognize the vague substantive category of contestable decisions. Put another 
way, each of the exemplars is itself a category of decisions but, like orders on injunctions 
or partial final judgments, they are relatively clear, classical categories, constituted by 
definitive procedural boundaries. 
V. FINALITY-FOR-APPEAL: A QUASI-CLASSICAL AND A CONCEPTUAL CATEGORY
When litigants seek (or appellate judges want to hear) an appeal that does not fit into 
one of the established categories, either classical or categorical, they are left arguing (or 
holding) that it should be considered final-for-appeal under § 1291. The finality-for-appeal 
doctrines are different interpretations of the final-judgment rule that deem certain 
categories of decisions final-for-appeal, even though they are neither formal final 
judgments nor truly final decisions. 
The finality-for-appeal doctrines each owe their origins to creative re-
                                                          
207. See, e.g., Couch v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2010); In re Suntrust Banks, Inc. ERISA 
Litig., No. 08-CV-3384, 2011 WL 13824, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 3, 2011); City of Dearborn v. Comcast of 
Michigan, Inc., No. 08-10156, 2008 WL 5084203, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2008); 2 BARBARA J. VAN 
ARSDALE ET AL., FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 3:218 (2019). 
208. See, e.g., Tanasi v. New All. Bank, 786 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 2015); Muniz v. Sabol, 517 F.3d 29, 32 
(1st Cir. 2008); Fasano v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 457 F.3d 274, 279 (3d Cir. 2006); In re Baker & Getty 
Fin. Servs., Inc., 954 F.2d 1169, 1172 (6th Cir. 1992) 
209. See, e.g., Couch, 611 F.3d at 633. 
 210. As a counterbalance to the open-ended, standard-like nature of § 1292(b), the doctrine does incorporate 
some bright- solutely required; the time for 
filing the petition for appeal after receiving the certification is short (ten days); and the district court order 
declining to certify a decision for appeal is not, itself, appealable. See 20 WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 198, at 
§ 109 n.56; cf. In re Donald Trump, 928 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2019) (using mandamus to direct the district court to 
certify an immediate appeal under 1292(b)); see also Bryan Lammon, Appellate Jurisdiction in the Fourth 
Circuit’s Emoluments Appeals, FINAL DECISIONS (July 10, 2019), https://finaldecisions.org/appellate-
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conceptualizing of the final-judgment rule although some of them have now evolved into 
quasi-classical categorical rules. 
As explained above, the idea of finality-for-appeal is flexible: it resists clear 
definiti 211
212 213 That is because finality-for-appeal is, at least originally, 
a conceptual category. It can be modeled as a radial structure with positive and negative 
prototypes and exemplars. As explained below, the central prototype anchoring the 
concept of finality-for-appeal is the idea of the end the case. 
While the final-judgment rule is a rule (if a decision is final, then it is immediately 
appealable), the finality-for-appeal doctrines use that bright-line rule to always permit an 
immediate appeal only from conceptually constituted categories of orders. For a court to 
order fit into a conceptual c if it does, then the final-judgment rule provides 
that the order is immediately appealable. 
A. Quasi-Classical Categorical Rules: True Finality and the Collateral Order Doctrine 
1. True Finality 
Based on the prototype of formal final judgments, courts have long recognized 
another category of orders those that essentially end the case on the merits that is also 
considered final.214 That category of orders, those with so- 215 began 
as a conceptual category and evolved into a quasi-classical one. It is now usually defined 
using the famous formulation from Catlin v. United States:
one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but 
execute the ju 216 § 1291, 
give rise to the right to appeal, and start the clock on the deadline for filing a notice of 
appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a).217 Thus, the final-judgment rule operates on truly-final 
                                                          
 211. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974). 
 212. Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 26 (1945). 
 213. Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964). 
 214. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 299, 233 (1945). 
215. See Lammon, Finality, Appealability, supra note 24, at 1825 26. 
 216. Catlin, 324 U.S at 233. The Supreme Court alone has cited the Catlin formulation twenty-three times. 
Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1716 (2017); Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 574 U.S. 405, 408 
(2015); Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of Int  Union of Operating Eng rs & Participating Emp rs, 
571 U.S. 177 (2014); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 690 (2010); Mohawk Indus., 
Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 116 (2009); Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 79, 86 (2008); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-
Ala. v. Randolph, 539 U.S. 79, 86 (2000); Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 204 (1999); 
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 
863, 867 (1994); FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Invr s Mortg. Ins., 498 U.S. 269, 273 (1991); Midland Asphalt Corp. v. 
United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 522, 527 (1988); Budinich 
v. Becton Dickinson and Co., 485 U.S. 271, 275 (1988); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 
U.S. 271, 275 (1988); Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 374 (1987); Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373 74 (1981); Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 
572, 580 (1980); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978); Rederi A/B Disa v. Cunard S.S. Co., 
389 U.S. 852, 854 (1967); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 361 (1962); Balt. Contractors v. 
Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 n.4 (1955); Radio Station WOW, 326 U.S. at 123 24 . The Courts of Appeals have cited 
it hundreds more. See 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 55, at § 3910. 
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decisions with nearly218 classical-categorical, rule-like clarity and predictability: If an 
order decides the merits of the case, and the only thing that remains is executing the 
judgment, then it is a truly final decision, and it is appealable under § 1291. 
The classical Catlin definition of true finality evolved over time from a more 
conceptual view of finality, based on the intuitive sense that some decisions that do not 
end a case nonetheless look a lot like the end of a case (or a lot like a formal final judgment) 
and should give rise to a right to appeal. Earlier cases sometimes express this looser 
conceptual view. In the 1855 case Craighead v. Wilson, for example, the Court describes 
a prior case, Whiting v. Bank of the United States, as holding that a decision was final 
219 And the Court 
in Whiting imagined that an even earlier case finding an interlocutory decree appealable 
must have been  comparing the decree to a final judgment (despite never saying so).220
Today, the language used to describe finality still bears traces of this earlier 
conceptual final-judgment-as-prototype thinking. Perhaps most obviously, although 
§ 1291 gran decisions 221 it is 
-judgment which functions as a reminder that its 
222 Courts often use 
metaphors to describe finality that highlight the centrality of final judgments to the 
cornerstone of the 
223 When deciding whether an order is final, 
judges wonder how metaphorically close it is to a formal 
 is not necessarily the ultimate judgment or decree completely closing up a 
 But it is not easy to determine what decisions short of that point 224
The Catlin
a typical final decision, thus suggesting both that the category of finality described could 
be graded and its outer boundaries blurred.225 Likewise, when the Court cites Catlin, it 
usually qualifies the definition by stating, for example, that it describes a final decision in 
226 typically are ones that trigger the entry 
                                                          
See Lammon, Finality, Appealability, supra note 24, at 30 36. 
 218. . . . Catlin, 324 
U.S. at 233, so that a decision can be considered truly final even if some issues (in addition to assessment of 
Budinich, 486 U.S. at 198; Ray Haluch Gravel,
571 U.S. at 188 90); ministerial or technical damages calculations (Lammon, Finality, Appealability, supra note 
24, at 26 27); or the claims of other parties in an MDL case (Gelboim, 574 U.S. at 415 17). 
 219. Craighead v. Wilson, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 199, 201 (1855). 
 220. Whiting v. Bank of U.S., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 6, 15 (1839) This decision must have been made upon the 
general ground, that a decree, final upon the merits of the controversy between the parties, is a decree upon which 
a bill of review would lie, without and independent of any ulterior proceedings. Indeed, the ulterior proceedings 
) (discussing Ray v. Law, 
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 179 (1805)). 
 221. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (emphasis added). 
 222. Gelboim, 574 U.S. at 408 (emphasis added) (quoting Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233) (noting that § core 
application 
 223. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962) (emphasis added). 
 224. United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land in Town of Babylon, 129 F.2d 678, 680 (2d Cir. 1942) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Rubert Hermanos, Inc., v. People of P.R., 118 F.2d 752, 757 (1st Cir. 1941)). 
 225. Catlin, 324 U.S at 233. 
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227 Last year, in Hall v. Hall
archetypal final decision is one[] that trigger[s] 228
When it comes to true finality, these various turns of phrase are the vestiges of an 
earlier mode of thought. The true-finality category is now essentially classically defined. 
deciding the merits and leaving 
nothing to do but enter judgment have more-or-less crystallized into an either/or 
question, as illustrated by two modern cases exploring its boundaries. In Budinich v. 
Becton Dickinson and Ray Haluch Gravel v. Central Pension Fund, the Court held that an 
decided later.229 A literal application of the Catlin definition would have required the 
opposite outcome, because something else undeniably remained for the trial court to do 
besides executing the judgment. But, in Budinich, the Court recognized that the Catlin
timately question-
230
Therefore, the Court opted for a classical categorical holding and a new bright-line 
rule that resol
of 
§ 231 When the question arose again in Ray Haluch, the Court quickly rejected a 
variation on the argument from Budinich
the merits when the fee claim was based on a contract, rather than a statute.232 It did so by 
first repeating the policy reasons identified in Budinich (operational consistency and 
Budinich established.233 In the 
interests of clarity, the Court drew an admittedly arbitrary line. Even when a statute or 
do), the Court was 
imposing its own bright-line definition for purposes of defining true finality under § 1291. 
2. The Collateral Order Doctrine 
category, the most well-developed finality-for-appeal doctrine is the collateral order 
doctrine. It has been refined and evolved over time so that it also now almost resembles a 
classical rule. 
                                                          
571 U.S. 177, 183 (2014). 
 227. Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 228. Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118 (2018) (alteration in the original) (emphasis added) (quoting Mohawk Indus.,
Inc., 558 U.S. at 103). 
 229. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988); Ray Haluch Gravel, 571 U.S. at 183 
(2014). 
230. Budinich, 486 U.S. 
not necessary before a decision is fin
remaining to be decided after an order ending litigation on the merits does not prevent finality if its resolution 
will not alter the order or moot or revise decisions embodied in -line of the 
Catlin decision. Id. (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 308 09 (1962); Dickinson v. 
Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 513 16 (1950)). 
231. Id. at 202. 
232. Ray Haluch Gravel, 571 U.S. at 184. 
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In the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court recognized a new finality-for-
appeal doctrine, the collateral order doctrine.234 In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan 
Corp., the Court held that § 
235 ich 
finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the 
action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require 
that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is ad 236
That original formulation of the collateral-order doctrine was an undertheorized 
-judgment 
of the case to defer review.237
238 by subsequent cases into a nearly 
classical category, with the necessary-and-sufficient elements of a classical definition:  
the order must [1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important 
issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable 
on appeal from a final judgment.239
Still, the boundaries of the collateral-order doctrine can be difficult to pin down, hence the 
numerous cases described above where the Courts of Appeals have disagreed on its 
application.240 And close attention to its origins in Cohen shows how the collateral order 
doctrine works as a conceptual category structured radially around positive and negative 
prototypes. The positive prototype is the end of the case and the formal final judgment. 
The negative prototype is a tentative order that is just a step toward final judgment. 
In Cohen, the issue was whether the district court order declining to apply a state-
law expense-shifting statute to a stockholder derivative suit was an appealable final 
decision.241 To answer that question, the Court made some necessary rhetorical moves 
before arriving at the original collateral-order formulation quoted above. First, the Court 
had to blur the boundaries of finality, to stretch them beyond a pure classical definition 
that encompassed only formal final judgments. It did so by invoking the purpose of § 1292 
other than final judgments when they have a final and 
242 The Court used this quick foray into the 
legislative intent of a different section to extend the category of final decisions under 
§ 1291 beyond final judgments, while maintaining the centrality of the final judgment to 
                                                          
 234. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
235. Id. at 546 47.  
 236. Id. at 546. 
237. See Lammon, Rules, Standards, supra note 16, at 449; Anderson, supra note 44, at 559. 
 238. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006). 
 239. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978); see Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 
U.S. 100, 106 (2009). 
240. See supra notes 10 15 and accompanying text; see also Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver 
Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of 
Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.
something of a hybrid: it is standardlike in determining whether the criteria of the doctrine have been met, but it 
.
 241. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545. 
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the category. 
Next, the Court had to limit the category somehow. It did so by using a negative 
243 That negative prototype marks the outer limit of 
the reconfigured final-decisions category. Cohen
in prototypical terms, first centering the category on (without limiting it to) the positive 
prototype of the final judgment, and then limiting the reach of the category by pointing to 
the negative prototype of the unappealable tentative decision. 
Those positive and negative prototypes are still detectable in the more classical 
definition used to identify collateral orders today. Understood in terms of those two 
prototypes, the collateral order doctrine covers decisions that: like a final judgment,
unlike a tentative step toward final judgment
244
B. Conceptual Categorical Rules: The Pragmatic Appeals Doctrines 
The pragmatic appeals doctrines are conceptual categorical rules that, unlike the 
collateral order doctrine, have resisted distillation into classical categorical rules.245 These 
doctrines include the hardship-finality doctrine from Forgay and the balancing approach 
from Gillespie.246
is unclear, largely because they remain incompletely theorized conceptual categorical 
rules. 
1. The Hardship Appeals Doctrine 
In the mid-nineteenth century, when the Court first began to experiment with flexible 
interpretations of the final-judgment rule (before many of the appealability innovations 
discussed above), it developed the first finality-for-appeal doctrines.247 In 1848, the Court 
held in Forgay v. Conrad that an immediate appeal was permitted from a trial court order 
conveying property to an opposing party even though the case was continuing for an 
accounting of the property so the ndoubtedly [was] not final, in the strict, 
248
Forgay reasoned that such an order was final for appeal because it risked an 
immediate harm the opposing party could execute immediately and quickly sell the 
                                                          
243. Id. at 546. 
244. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468; see Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 106. 
245. See Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 16, at 405 10. 
 246. Forgay hardship doctrine and 
Gillespie  balancing approach; others treat them as more separate. See 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra 
note 55, at §§ 3910, 3911. Coopers & Lybrand, they would 
- Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. 
at 463. 
247. See Lammon, Finality, Appealability, supra note 24, at 1825. 
 248. Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 203 (1848); see generally 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,
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property that could not be remedied on appeal.249 Since then, the Forgay hardship 
doctrine has rarely been invoked, but it has not disappeared entirely, and there are later 
cases recognizing a similar finality-for-appeal doctrine based on irreparable hardship.250
2. The Balancing Approach 
Over a century later, the Court took another swing at a pragmatic, flexible finality-
for-appeal doctrine in the 1964 case of Gillespie v. U.S. Steel.251 The case involved state 
and federal tort claims.252 When the trial court dismissed all the state claims, the plaintiff 
immediately appealed, even though the federal claim remained and the case was not 
over.253 The appellate court did not answer whether the decision was final and appealable, 
but the Supreme Court held that it was.254
meaning of § 1291 does not necessarily mean the last order possible to be made in a 
255
frequently so close a question that decision of that issue either way can be supported with 
equally forceful arguments, and that it is impossible to devise a formula to resolve all 
256
than a technical construction,  the Court held the decision was immediately 
appealable.257 The decision did not fit into any existing categories of appealable orders: it 
was not appealable under Rule 54(b) (the claims were not severable), the collateral order 
doctrine (the issue was not separate from the merits), or § 1292(b) (the trial court had not 
certified it for appeal).258 But the Court relied on the practical justifications motivating 
those three doctrines because, under the circumstances, the benefits of an immediate 
of a second appeal after final judgment).259 Gillespie  practical, context-specific, cost-
benefit balancing approach was the high-water mark for case-by-case appealability 
doctrines.260 But the Court backed away from it later, apparently limiting its holding to its 
                                                          
249. Forgay, 47 U.S. e right to the property in contest, and directs it to 
be delivered up by the defendant to the complainant, or directs it to be sold, or directs the defendant to pay a 
certain sum of money to the complainant, and the complainant is entitled to have such decree carried immediately 
into execution, the decree must be regarded as a final one to that extent, and authorizes an appeal to this court, 
although so much of the bill is retained in the Circuit Court as is necessary for the purpose of adjusting by a 
furth Radio Station Wow, Inc. v. 
Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945); Carondelet Canal & Nav. Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U.S. 362 (1914); Thomson v. 
Dean, 74 U.S. (9 Wall.) 342 (1869). 
 250. Radio Station Wow, 326 U.S. at 120; Carondelet Canal & Nav. Co., 233 U.S. at 362; Thomson, 74 U.S. 
at 342. 
 251. Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964). 
252. Id. at 149 50. 
253. Id. at 150. 
254. Id. 151 52. 
255. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949)). 
256. Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 152. 
257. Id. at 151 52 (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546). 
258. Id. at 152 54. 
259. Id.
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specific facts.261
At first glance, both the Forgay hardship doctrine and the Gillespie balancing 
doctrine seem more like case-by-case standards (like appellate mandamus or certiorari) 
than like the final-judgment rule they are supposedly implementing. And there are cases 
in the Courts of Appeals, and even occasionally (although not recently) in the Supreme 
Court, applying them on a case-by-case basis.262 But, if these pragmatic appeals doctrines 
are to survive, they cannot be case-by-
imperative requires courts to decide finality-for-appeal categorically, not on a case-by-
case basis. And, the final-judgment rule which these doctrines are implementing is a 
bright-line rule permitting an appeal, not a standard. Thus, for the pragmatic appeal 
doctrines to survive, they must have an identifiable categorical basis and must enable 
courts to identify clear categories of decisions. 
In their current formulations, the Forgay hardship doctrine and the Gillespie
balancing doctrine do not seem to enable such categorization. It is tempting to try to turn 
the Forgay hardship doctrine into a categorical rule allowing an immediate appeal from 
any order that immediately transfers property from one party to the other and thereby risks 
irreparable harm if an appeal is delayed until the case is concluded.263 But that cannot be 
true, and the boundaries of the doctrine are unclear: perhaps it applies only to decisions 
sanctions which require an immediate payment to the opposing party bu
another doctrine, like the collateral order doctrine or Rule 54(b), could apply.264
The contours of the Gillespie balancing approach are, if anything, less clear than the 
Forgay Gillespie
piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the 
265 suggesting that weighing cost against the risk of injustice could be sufficient 
to determine appealability. But, once again, that cannot be true, particularly after the 
Gillespie, the Court suggested a few other 
[] [ ; and, 
266 But they, too, do not add up to a classical categorical definition. 
                                                          
 261. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 n.30 (1978). 
262. See cases cited supra note 249 (post-Forgay cases applying versions of the hardship doctrine); Lammon, 
Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 16, at 386 410 (describing areas where courts continue to apply versions of the 
Gillespie balancing approach). 
263. See Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848); 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 55, at
§ 3910 nn.30 31. 
264. See 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 55, at § 3910 nn.38 63. 
 265. Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 53 (1964) (quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion 
Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)). 
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CONCLUSION
It is imperative, and perhaps inevitable, that the pragmatic appeals doctrines or
other similarly conceptual categorical finality-for-appeal doctrines survive. The 
inevitable pressure for innovation in deciding appealability is an unstoppable force; and 
t is an immovable object. Although the various 
appealability doctrines help avoid many collisions, courts and litigants keep finding new 
cases where they require greater flexibility than the existing doctrines provide. Courts need 
the freedom to develop new, flexible, but not entirely unbounded, appealability doctrines. 
An explicitly conceptual approach could address appeals that do not fit within 
existing categories. A conceptual approach will eventually allow courts to identify new 
categories of decisions to be considered final-for-appeal. Fuzzy and undefined conceptual 
categories can, over time, give rise to more definite classical categories but only if the 
courts have the opportunity to implement and iterate on them. Shutting down emerging 
finality-for-
imperative would frustrate that development. 
The conceptual development of the pragmatic appealability doctrines through future 
cases will take time. Most appealability issues are already addressed by the more 
developed appealability doctrines, so the conceptual approach to finality-for-appeal will 
only come into play occasionally. But we can begin to sketch a concept model of finality-
for-appeal to be used by courts. As explained above, conceptual categories are radially 
constructed based on similarity to positive and negative prototypes and exemplars, and 
that similarity depends on shared family resemblances, an overlap of some, but not 
necessarily all, features.267 The pragmatic appeals doctrines each identify a few salient 
features. But for those doctrines to evolve, or for courts to develop new finality-for-appeal 
categories, courts must be allowed to create new categories of appealable orders, described 
by new sets of shared features. 
The evolution of the collateral order doctrine demonstrates how this would work. 
That doctrine shows the appropriate positive and negative prototypes for conceptualizing 
new finality-for-appeal categories. The positive prototype is the idea of a final judgment 
that ends the case; the negative prototype is the idea of a tentative order that is just a step 
in the case. Drawing on all of the appealability doctrines, we can compile a non-exhaustive 
list of those prototypes  relevant features. Any new conceptual finality-for-appeal doctrine 
will draw on some combination of these features: 
Features of Final Judgments (the positive prototype):
Ends the proceedings268;
Conclusively decides a question269;
Decides a merits question270;
                                                          
267. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 268. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, [G]enerally one which ends the litigation on the merits and 
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.
 269. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (emphasis added) conclusively determine the 
disputed questio ; Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
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271;
Immediately transfers property272;
Is important to resolving the case273;
Is, if erroneous, only reparable if reviewed now274;
Is distinct from the rest of the case275;
Is procedurally distinct or identifiable276;
Is more efficient to review now277;
Features of Tentative-Step Orders (the negative prototype): 
Is provisional278;
Is purely procedural279;
Is mooted by a final merits appeal280;
Is inefficient to review now281;
These lists reflect some of the features of the positive and negative prototypes that 
the existing finality doctrines identify as potentially salient to the concept of finality. These 
lists are necessarily impressionistic and non-exhaustive they are trying to capture 
intuitive understandings that are often not explicitly stated. Importantly, these features are 
not necessary-and-sufficient conditions; they need not all be present to mark an order as 
falling into a category (just as not all birds must fly to fall in the category Indeed, 
some of them are contradictory and could not both be features of the same order. New 
conceptual categories of appealable orders could be described by family resemblances 
among orders that each share some, but not all, of a relevant set of features. Although 
courts and rule-makers have identified more features of the positive prototype than the 
negative one (likely because they have focused on identifying the elements of finality), 
future cases could recognize new features of either prototype, or new combinations of 
already recognized features, to delineate new categories of final-for-appeal decisions. 
* * * 
-for-appeal must 
                                                          
271. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468 Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546 (emphasis 
added) y determine claims of right
 272. Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204 (1848). 
273. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468 .
 274. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 
.
 275. Id. ;
 276. FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a), (c); FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
 277. FED. R. CIV. P. . . . may 
materially advance the ultimate termina
 278. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546 
towards [the] .
279. See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108 (2009) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981)) 
.
 280. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 rits of 
 281.  Petroleum Conversion 
Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 325, 325 (1940); Sears, Roebuck & Co. 
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be decided only for categories of orders aims to curtail the proliferation of new case-by-
case appealability rulings. But it must not be read to shut down the possibility of judicial 
innovations in appealability. Parties and judges have always used conceptual thinking
analogies and metaphors, similarity and typicality, prototypes and exemplars, family 
resemblances and shared features to identify new categories for immediate appeals. They 
should continue to do so. Indeed, they should explicitly describe the conceptual models 
guiding their thinking, identifying features that each proposed new category of orders 
shares with existing positive and negative prototypes of appealability. Perhaps further 
common-law percolation will reveal new classical categories of orders that should be 
considered final-for-appeal. But to get there, judges need to retain the freedom and 
flexibility of a conceptual approach. 
